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I. INTRODUCTION 
One of the leading hypotheses advanced to interpret the significance 
of religion in modern society is undoubtedly the hypothesis o£ seculariza-
tion. Unlike most of the journalists and theologians who have largely 
taken secularization as an established fact, contemporary sociologists of 
religion are by no means in agreement not only about the nature, causes, 
and the future course of secularization but also about the very occurrence 
of secularization itself. Contemporary sociologists who are interested in 
this topic can be roughly divided into two opposing camps. Whereas one 
camp maintains that secularization is definitely taking place as religion 
is progressively becoming marginal and irrelevant--if not disappearing--
both in social life and in individual consciousness, the other camp 
insists that the concept of secularization is more a myth than a fact for 
religion has not shown any sign of decline or demise. What is more remark-
able is that the same sociologists may belong to one camp in one context 
and switch to the opposing camp in another--that is, he may argue against 
the secularization hypothesis in one discussion and talk in favor of it 
in another. Although all sociologists of religion are fully aware of the 
scarcity of empirical data and the inadequacy of the data that are avail-
able, both opponents and exponents of the secularization hypothesis have 
marshalled empirical materials to endorse their respective positions. 
The purpose of this thesis is to trace out the source of these discrep-
ancies in the current discussion of secularization. 
~ 
Due to its popularity, articles, books, and conventions have been 
dedicated to the thesis of secularization. One can hardly find a con-
1 
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temporary textbook on religion without giving ~ome attent1.,on to this top1.c ... 
Yet, a contrasting analysis of contemporary perspectives on the issue of 
secularization is still wanting. Shiner~s (1967) landmark article, nThe 
Concept of Secularization in Empirical Research, t in which he constructed 
six ideal types of the meaning of secularization, is an interdisciplinary 
rather than a purely sociological study. In his master~s thesis, "The 
Codification of the Sociological Theory on Secularization,~~ Tellis-
Nayak (1970) attempted to arrange some of the contemporary theories on 
secularization into an individualization-rationalization framework, treat-
ing the objective, structural secularization and the subjective, individual 
secularization as the subthemes of the general process of individualiza-
tion and rationalization. In the article, '1Les Th~ories Sociologiques 
Concernant la S~cularisation-Typologie at Critique, 11 which later, with 
some changes, was developed into a book, Lauwers (1973} classified some 
major sociological theories on secularization into three types: pluraliza-
tion (Herberg and Yinger), privatization (Berger and Luckroann), and 
rationalization (Weber and Wilson). In his book, The Sociology of 
Secularization: A Critique of a Concept, Glasner (1976) took a sharp issue 
with the concepts of secularization in sociological literature criticiz-
ing them as social myths rather than scientific constructs. All these 
studies tend to treat the theorists as though they all took seculariza-
tion as an empirically a~ready verified fact and overlooked some important 
distinctions they have made, implicitly and explicitly, i_n their discus-
sion of secularization. What distinguishes the present study from all 
the previous ones is the effort to bring to light these distinctions 
that qualify the arguments of the sociologists about the issue of 
3 
secularization. It is argued that the current conflicting and ambiguous 
views on secularization stem1 to a very large extent, from the different 
definitions of religion that contemporary sociologists of religion 
employed in their discussion of secularization. Sociologists differ 
greatly in defining religion. By the term "religion," they may refer to 
a particular religious tradition, or they may mean religion in general. 
Even when they speak of religion in general, some may define religion so 
broadly that they include in their definition even those belief systems 
that are normally considered non-religious or even anti-religious such as 
Communism; others may exclude such systems in their definition of religion. 
In general, if religion is defined in generic terms, sociologists adopt-
ing an exclusive definition of religion tend to defend the secularization 
thesis understood as the decline of religion, whereas those preferring 
an inclusive definition tend to reject it; but none of the contemporary 
sociologists is willing to accept a concept of secularization that suggests 
en eventual total disappearance of religion. However, if religion is 
defined in terms of a particular religious tradition, all sociologists 
tend to argue for the secularization thesis, at least, when it indicates 
the decline of religion; some are even in favor of a concept of seculariza-
tion that refers to a complete demise of religion. 
This study is divided into two major sections. In the first section, 
attempt is made to analyze how the different definitions of religion which 
contemporary sociologists adopt, have affected their views on the nature, 
alleged causes, and future direction of secularization. The objective of 
the second section is to point out how the different definitions of religion 
." 
have influenced the sociologists in their interpretation of historical, 
statistical, and survey data, as well as their evaluation of the signifi-
4 
cance of the upsurge of the so-called new religions. 
This analysis is confined, chiefly, to the views of Yinger, Bellah, 
Parsons, Greeley, Glock, Berger, O~Dea, Luckmann, Martin, Wilson, and 
Acquaviva. These sociologists of religion are selected not just because 
they have shown a sustained interest in the issue of secularization, but 
especially because their positions are representative of those of the con-
temporary sociologists who have discussed the topic of secularization. 
In the absence of a universally accepted de:l;inition o£ religion, any 
critique of the different approaches to the issue of secularization must 
be based on a particular definition of religion with i.ts own bias. Hence, 
this analysis is intended to be descriptive rather· than criti.cal .. 
II. THEORETICAL DISCREPANCIES 
With rare exceptions (Becker, 1932, 1967; Goodridge, 1968), the 
notion of secularization, variously conceptualized as it i.s, is con-
ceptualized in terms of religion. The definition o£ religion determines, 
to a very considerable degree, a sociologist '·s assessment of religion ~s 
past, present, and future significance in society and, consequently, his 
position on the issue of secularization. Despite its importance, not all 
sociologists concerned with the problem of secularization have put forward 
a clear-cut definition of religion: some have proposed more than one, 
others none. In order to classify a sociologist\s stand in the discussion 
of secularization, a typical definition of religion will be selected if he 
has offered several; in case he has given none, effort will be made to 
gather information from the scattered texts of his works to ascertain what 
he means by religion. This section is intended to point out the :;i.mplica-
tions of the definition of religion for a diagnosis of secularization's 
occurrence, the evaluation of its alleged causes, and the predictions of 
its future course. 
Definitions of Religion and Conceptualization 
of Secularization 
Definitions of religion proposed by sociologists have been variously 
classified. Some sociologists such as Berger (1967a:l75~178, 1971, 1974), 
Luckmann (1967:41-43, 1971, 1977), Dobbelaere and Lauwers (1973) divide 
them into substantive and functio.nal definitions in terms of whether 
emphasis is placed on the content of religion, or on what religion does 
.... 
for society or the individual. Other writers like Towler (1974;15-18) 
and Machaleck (1977) distinguish between real and nominal definitions 
5 
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depending on whether they correspond to all concrete manifestations of 
religion known, or are just arbitrary constructions of the investigators 
for their specific researches. For our purpose, it seems convenient to 
follow yet another group of sociologists such as Robertson (1970:35-41) 
and Jackson (1974:7-13) and classify them into exclusive and inclusive 
definitions. Exclusive definitions tend to follow the tradition of Otto 
and exclude what are conventionally considered not as religions, whereas 
inclusive definitions are more in line with Durkheim's school and include 
also what are normally regarded not as religions. Practically, exclusive 
definitions can be equated with substantive and real definitions, and 
inclusive definitions with functional and nominal ones. ~fbile sociolo-
gists committed to an exclusive definition are more likely to argue in 
favor of the secularization hypothesis, those opting for an inclusive 
definition tend to refuse it. 
Inclusive Definitions 
One group of sociologists choose to define religion so broadly that 
any notion of secularization, seen as ~'dereligionizationu (Robertson, 
1947:48) is virtually impossible. According to these sociologists, 
religion does change in content and form but it never declines or demises. 
The most inclusive definition of religion ever advanced by a 
sociologist is probably the one proposed by Luckmann. Religion is, 
according to him, "that that makes a human organism a human~• (das, was den 
II 
Menschen zum Menschen lasst) (1972:5). Since, empirically, it is the 
world view which performs such a function, Luckmann (1967:53) calls the 
world view 11 the elementary social form of religion," and as such, it is 
considered as constitutive of both individual and society. 
The statement that religion is present in non-
specific form in all societies and all ''·normal" 
7 
individuals is, therefore, axiomatic. It specifies a 
religious dimension in the 'definition' of individual 
and society but is empty of specific empirical content 
(Luckmann, 1967:78). 
Berger (1971:52) comments on Luckmann's definition of religion: "Since no 
man or society can exist without religion (in Luckmann's definition), there 
can be no secularization proper--there is only shift and change of religion." 
Indeed, Luckmann (1969, 1971, 1977) considers the notion of secular!-
zation that suggests the decline of religion or the disappearance of 
religion as a contemporary myth, created by those theologians, sociolo-
gists, and historians who, seeking for a systematic historical understand-
ing of the emergence, nature, and uniqueness of modern world, employed a 
substantive, narrow definition of religion, often identifying religion 
tout court with its organizational and institutional forms, presumed the 
existence of a golden era of religion from which religion began to deter!-
orate, and adopted the positivistic view of historical evolution that as 
human reason develops religion automatically declines. Because the notion 
of secularization originates in the desire for a comprehensive account of 
the felt uniqueness of modern world, Luckmann notes that "in a manner of 
speaking, the roots of the notion of secularization are religious" (1977: 
17), and such an account, "subverted by ideological oversimplifications," 
is called ''mythological" because it is "a historical narrative which con-
tains a number of fictitious elements" (Luckmann, 1977:17). 
Parsons, in his early writings (1951:326-383; 1952:283-296) empha-
sizes religion on personality level; but, in his later works (1964; 1966b: 
28-29; 1971:207-245), he conceives religion primarily as the ultimate 
value that informs the whole social order and interprets it in terms of 
the cybernetic hierarchy of control. 
8 
. • • for many years, the general view which I have been 
espousing is that, in the socio-cultural sphere, and 
indeed also the psychological, what has come generally 
to be called 'religion' stands at the highest level in 
the cybernetic hierarchy of the forces which, in the 
sense of defining the general directionality of hum~n 
action among the possible alternatives pe.rmitted in the 
human condition, controls the process of human action 
(Parsons, 1971:215-216). 
Society is seen, in keeping with the Durkhe~ian tr~dition, a$ a religi-
ously based moral order char~cterized by congruence within and b~tween the 
cultural, structural, and personality levels of the social system (Fenn, 
1970: 117-136). Thus, every society manifests religious. values, and every 
human action is guided, directly or indirectly, by religion. When every 
social order and human action is necessarily congruent with religious 
values, a secularized society or individual is no longer conceivable. 
Parsons calls the concept of secularization defined as the loss of 
religious commitment or the diminution of religious influence a misinter-
pretation (1971:217-218) and a false identification of religion with 
other worldliness (1963: 36-37). 
While Luckmann and Parsons focus on religion as an objectiyated 
meaning or value system that regulates, controls, and transforms indi-
viduals, another group of sociologists, inspired by Tillich, regard 
religion primarily as a cultural tool invented by man to cope with ulti-
mate problems of existence. Thus, Yinger defines religion as 
. • • a system of beliefs and practices by means. of which 
a group of people struggle with these ultimate problems 
of human life. It expresses their refusal to capitulate 
to death, to give up in the face of frustration, to allow 
hostility to tear apart their human associations (1970;7). 
Bellah employs a similar definition: "religion is a set o;l; symbolic 
forms and acts which relate men to the ultimate conditions of hi.s exist-
ence" (1970: 21). Likewise, Martin sees. religion as ~'man 1 s attempt to 
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come to a working settlement with the condition in whi.ch he finds himself" 
(1965:12-13). Though what are considered as the ultimate problems and the 
ways of coping with them may change over time,. there will, according to 
these sociologists, always be problems which cannot be adjusted or solved 
with empirical resources and rational means, and menwill always resort to 
supra-empirical means to deal with them (Yinger, 1967;20; 1970:9-12; 
Bellah, 1970:203; Martin, 1969:5-6). In other words, thecontent and form 
of religion may change as perceptions of the ultimate problems change, but 
without religion, man would not be human (Bellah, 1970:203). Renee, one 
should not ask whether or how much people al;'e religious, but how and how 
differently people are religious (Yinger, 1970:34-35; 488-489)~ It is 
obvious that for these sociologists, the idea of religious decline or 
demise is logically unimaginable. 
Yinger (1963:67-74) maintains that the notion of the decline of 
religion is rooted in the faulty definition of religion in terms of a set 
of unmodifiable beliefs and practices, which resembles Bellah's J;"emark 
that the idea of secularization originates ft;"om the identification of 
religion with "belief," understood as an absolutized set of propositions 
(Bellah, 1970:221-222). Furthermore, to Bellah, as to Luckmann? the idea 
that as science advances, religion declines or disappears, is not a 
scientific notion.but a religious one, since it functions basically to 
create an emotionally coherent picture (1970:237). The unitary, irrever-
sible understanding of secularization stems, according to Mat;"tin (1969:1-
36), from a purist definition of religion, a unilinear view of history, 
the idea of a universal convergence of culture, and an attempt to simplify 
the complexity of religious change in the interest Q;i; a counter-religious 
ideology. 
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In addition to viewing religion as "tentative answers to the ulti-
mate mysteries" (Greeley, 1973:175), Greeley conceives rel;i.gion as 
designed to satisfy certain permanent human needs: the needs for belonging 
to a group which shares his ultimate value commitment, integrating the 
disturbing forces of sexuality with the rest of life, coming into contact 
with the mysterious and the awesome, and finally, the need for having 
certain leaders who can furnish both comfort and challenge in the wrest-
ling with ultimate problems (1972a). As thes.e human needs al;'e postulated 
to persist, so is also the effort to find means to meet them: J:eligion. 
Partly reflecting the criticisms of Luckmann and Martin, Greeley (1972a: 
17-54; 1972b:l27-155) calls the conventional thesis of secularization 
understood whether as religious crisis or decline a myth supported 
neither by empirical data nor by sociological theories; i.t is rooted in 
doctrinaire assumptions about the nature of history and social change, in 
the interpretatidn of the religion of the general population in terms of 
the intellectuals' attitude toward religion, and in the idea that the 
present generation is the hinge of history. 
Most of the current criticisms of the concept of s.ecularization 
(Matthes, 1962a; 1962b:74-104; Rendtorf, 1966; Savramis, 1967; Watzke, 
1969; Towler, 1974:228-251; Brothers, 1973; Dobbeleare and Lauwers, 1973; 
Glasner, 1976) are either repetitions, reflections, or variants of the 
positions cited above. They are all derived, directly or indirectly, 
from a broad definition of religion and a nature of man that is postu-
lated, implicitly or explicitly, to be religious. Little attention has 
been given to the questions: Is a broad definition itsel:J; an ideology 
(Berg2r, 197 4)? Is religion universal (_Cohen, 1966)? Do all men 
actually always seek symbolic means to solve the "ultimate problems," or 
11 
to meet the alleged religious needs? Is society necessarily held by 
common values (Fenn, 1970)? Unless these questions are adequately 
ans~-1ered, all the criticisms of the concept of seculax-i.zation themselves 
might be just as based on doctrinaire assumptions as the concepts of 
secularization they criticize. 
Secularization Modified 
As indicated above, all these sociologists have launched their 
attacks on the notion of secularization from the $tandpo~nt of religion 
so inclusively defined that any conceptualization of decline of religion 
as such is by definition ruled out. Yet,· some modified versions of 
secularization do appear, here and there, in their works. Such modified 
concepts of secularization are no longer constructed in te;r:-ms of religion 
per se, but in terms of a particular form of religion.. Thus, Yinger 
(1963:67-74) maintains that the concept of secularization makes sense 
only from the point of view of a specific religious tradition at a given 
time. Indeed, in his early work (1951;119) he defi.nes secularization as 
"the process in which traditional religious symbols and ;forms have lost 
force and appeal." Bellah, who argues for a distinction between "religion"· 
and "belief," states that "what is generally called secularization and the 
decline of religion would in this context appear as the decline of the 
external control system of religion and the decline of traditional 
religious belief" (1970:227). Elsewhere (Bellah, 1968:222), as an 
advocate of a religious evolutionary theory, he holds that uthe process 
of secularization involves a change in the structure rather the end of 
religion itself." Speaking of the Catholic Church after Vatican Il, 
Greeley (1966:119-120) characterizes the t;r:-ansition from a feudal 
organizational style to a modern large corporate one as secularization: 
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In becoming secular it is putting aside the stati..c, 
tribal, highly symbolic, ritualistic relationship that 
with some minor changes have been typical of it for half 
a millenium, and it is taking on the dynamic, rational-
ized, flexible, and technological relationships of the 
contemporary world. Just as the organization of the 
Church in the middle ages reflected the styles of organ-
ization to be found in the secular society (or perhaps 
vice versa) so the Catholic Church in the modexn world 
can be presumed to take on the organizational style which 
is characteristic of any large corporate body in the 
modern world (1966:120). 
Martin who so energetically called £or the eliJninati.on of the con-
cept of secularization (1967:9-12) has himself developed a general 
theory of secularization (1978), a theory, basically limited to 
Christianity, but, with modification, can also be applied to other 
religions (1978:1-2). Martint.s concept of seculari.zation is no longer 
understood as a universal, unilinear, and :irreversible process but con-
tains several more or less discrete and limited trends, varying both in 
direction and in degree under specific historical and cultural conditions 
(1978: 2). It could be thus called a ~'middle rangeH theory of seculariza-
tion. 
Luckmann (1963:150; 1967:28-40) employed the term secularization 
when he described the restricted Church participation in Europe and the 
"radical inner change in American church religion'' (1967 :36}. His early 
work (1963) was based on the hypothesis that with the growth of urbaniza-
tion men become less religious. rurthermore, he also developed his own 
theory of secularization that institutional segmentation has replaced 
religious values with functional rationality i.n the var:i.ous institu-
tiona! spheres such as economy and politics as he explains: 
• . . Secularization is not a process in which tradi-
tional religious values just fade away; it is a 
process in which internal institutional ideologies 
replace, within their own domain, an over-arching and 
transcendent universe of norms (1963:160). 
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Luckmann points out repeatedly that this theory refers only to the major 
institutions, not to the individuals or society at large (1969:179; 1973: 
78). In other words, social structure is secularized; individual and 
society are not. 
Probably the most peculiar and ambiguous concept of secularization 
current in the literature is the one formulated by Parsons. Positing 
society as a moral community and interpreting it in terms of cybernetic 
hierarchy of control, Parsons suggests that the question of seculariza-
tion should also be approached within the same framework of reference 
(1971:215-216). Since, for Parsons, as noted above, it is impossible to 
conceive any sector or individual in society as being uncontrolled by 
religious values, he has constructed a concept of secularization, not in 
terms of the decline of religion, but in terms of the institutionalization 
of religious values. It is a process in which religion, standing at the 
top of the cybernetic hie~archy of control and as the ultimate value and 
ground of meaning, progressively reintegrates those components in society 
which have, through differentiation, been separated from its influence. 
This integration is made possible by according religious significance to 
the secular components, which is, in turn, made possible by modifying 
previous religious values. Parsons calls the former process "adaptive 
upgrading," the later "value-generalization.u It is, therefore, 
inaccurate to regard Parsons' concept of secularization just as differen-
tiation. It is, as he himself interprets it, basically a dual process 
of differentiation and inclusion (1971:218-219). Indeed, by viewing 
secularization as the institutionalization of religious values, Parsons 
has emphasized inclusion at the expense of differentiation. In dis-
cussing inclusion, he seems to have overemphasized the moral upgrading 
14 
of the secular and overlooked the value-generalization, which is precisely 
what many authors call secularization. Elsewhere (1965a:46), Parsons 
grants that a society in which no religious institution is permitted to 
set normative standards for the general population, such as in the United 
States, may be defined as secularized 
Thus, although these sociologists criticize the concept of seculari-
zation in one context, they use it in another. Because of the recent dis-
cussion of the concept of secularization, it seems that some authors have 
become more cautious in using it; others even drop the term completely 
(Winter, 1977; Yinger: 1970 as compared with 1951). 
The concept of secularization cannot be conceived unless a fixed 
point of departure is established. Religion, inclusively defined, can 
have virtually all possible contents and forms and cannot be limited to a 
particular form or content. As such, it is unable to provide a starting 
point from which the process of secularization can begin. The modified 
notions of secularization, cited above, are only possible because a 
vantage point has been established, be it the traditional religion, a 
particular denomination, or the differentiated sectors, which is exactly 
what the sociologists who choose an exclusive definition of religion intend 
to do. 
Exclusive Definitions -
Another group of sociologists prefer a relatively narrow definition 
of religion, one that is not so narrow as can be identified with any par-
ticular form of religion, but narrow enough to make explicit the specific 
difference of religion so that the religious can be discerned from the non-
' 
religious, and thus make the conceptualization of secularization, even in 
terms of religion as such, possible. These sociologists, though varying 
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greatly in their elaboration of the definition of religion, all take the 
sacred, the supernatural, or their equivalents as the essential charac-
teristic of religion. 
Berger (1967a:l75-177; 1971; 1974a) has repeatedly discussed the 
implications of the definition of religion for the issue of secularization. 
He argues for a narrow definition of religion because the elimination of 
the problem of secularization by a broad definition, as Luckmann did, is 
a solution too easy to be meaningful. Religion is, for Berger, a symbolic 
cosmos constructed by man in relation to the sacred in order to provide an 
ultimate shield against chaos, which continuously threatens human exist-
ence (1967a:26-28; 1971:52-53). It is "a symbolic canopy stretched out 
over the network of social institutions, giving them an appearance of 
stability and rightness that they would otherwise lack (1967b:310). Secu-
larization is, logically, conceived as the progressive shrinkage of the 
sacred canopy or the gradual removal of the sacred cosmos from both 
social structure and individual consciousness (1967a:l05-108; 1967b:323-
324; 1974a:l32). He also defines secularization variously as the demise of 
the supernatural (1969:2-34), desacralization (1971), and the decline of 
the experience of transcendence (1976). 
Drawing on both functional and historical perspectives, O'Dea, 
though occasionally speaking of religion also in a broad sense as world 
view of value orientation (1971), sees religion, basically, as man's 
response to a beyond experienced as sacred when he faces the limit-
situation of contingency, powerlessness, and scarcity (1966:1-35). 
Religion is man's response to breaking points at 
which he experiences ultimate and sacred powers. Out 
of this experience religious organizations, ritual 
practices, and beliefs and values evolve. Such insti-
tutionalized religious forms express the human answer 
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engendered at the breaking points while putting men into 
ritual relationships with the sacred and ultimate power" 
(O'Dea, 1966:27). 
Despite his frequent remarks on the loss of direction or orientation in 
contemporary American society (1969, 1971), O'Dea conceives secularization 
mainly as a transformation of attitude and thought: 
Secularization can be said to consist fundamentally 
two related transformations in human thinking. There is the 
''desacralization'- of the attitude toward persons and things 
--the withdrawal of the kind of emotional involvement of the 
sacred. Secondly, there is the rationalization of thought--
the withholding of emotional participation in thinking about 
the world. Rationalization implies both a cognitive attitude 
relatively free of emotion, and the use of logic rather than 
an emotional symbolism to organize thought (O'Dea, 1966:81). 
In search for a general, elastic, and culture-free definition of 
religion, Acquaviva (1971:25-67) ended up simply with "the experience of 
the sacred." While the concepts of secularization formulated by Berger 
and O'Dea can, in its simplest form, labeled as desacralization, Acqua-
viva makes a clear distinction between secularization and descraliza-
tion. Secularization is conceived as the refusal of magical use of the 
sacred, or the unwillingness to attribute magical significance to things, 
events, or persons, whereas desacralization refers to the loss of capacity 
of the experience of the sacred, or the decline of intensity and diffu-
sion of the experience of the sacred (Acquaviva, 1971:66-67; Acquaviva 
and Guizzardi, 1971:35-36). This distinction makes possible the notion 
of a secularized religion, i.e., the experience of the sacred without 
magical manipulation of the sacred. In other words, a secularized man 
can still have a religion. But, a desacralized religion, i.e., a 
religion without the experience of the sacred, is, for Acquaviva, a con-
' 
tradition in term (1971:66). 
Some sociologists, though formally defining religion as such in 
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terms of the more general category of the supernatural or the sacred, are 
primarily concerned with the organized religions in their discussion of 
secularization. Thus, Wilson considers religious all "those activities 
and orientations that make explicit reference to the supernatural source 
of value" (1976b:4) or are "determined by faith in well-defined super-
natural order" (1971:256). Yet, he insists that the discussion of 
secularization should focus only on the gradual disregard of those beliefs 
and practices that received sustained social support and institutional 
expressions (1971:252-253). Hence, the concept of secularization advanced 
by Wilson refers primarily to the shift of conventional religion from 
"being central to the whole way of life" to being "no more than a leisure-
time pursuit" (1971:265), a concept almost identical with the one proposed 
by Luclcrnann. His often cited definition of seculartization reads: "The 
process whereby religious thinking, practice, and institutions lose social 
(emphasis mine) significance (1969:14). 
Similarly, Glock defines religion per se as any "value orientation 
that has a supernatural referent (Glock and Stark, 1964:17), but in all 
his works, he is preoccupied, as he himself attests (1967:29-30), with the 
significance of Christian religions in the beliefs and practices of indi-
vidual Americans. As a result, Glock defines secularization basically in 
terms of Christian beliefs variously as the process in which "a demytholo-
gized modernism is overwhelming the traditional, Christ-centered, mythical 
faith (Stark and Glock, 1968:205), or in which "the mythical, the super-
natural elements of traditional Christianity have been replaced by a 
demythologized, ethical rather than theological religion (Glock and 
Stark, 1965:116), or as the demise of the old time supernaturalism (Stark 
and Glock, 1968:213) and the demise of organized faith (Stark and Glock, 
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1968:216). What Wilson and Glock consider as secularization appears to 
concur with some of the modified versions of secularization mentioned 
above such as those of Yinger~ Bellah, Martin~ and Luckmann. 
secularization Modified 
So far it has been shown that~ by identifying the central category 
of religion as the supernatural~ the sacred~ or the like~ these 
sociologists have been able, each in his own way, to develop their par-
ticular concepts of secularization, which, in theory, can lead to the 
complete disappearance of religion. However, in their elaboration of the 
definition of religion, they all~ implicitly or explicitly, postulate a 
metatheoretical constant which makes it impossible for them to conceptua-
lize a notion of secularization that entails an inevitable demise of 
religion. 
Already in his early work (l967a, 1969) where he argues for the 
thesis of secularization of both socio-cultural sphere and individual 
consciousness, Berger states that "men are congenitally compelled to 
impose a meaningful order upon reality" (1967a:22) and talks about 
signals of transcendence metaphorically as rumors of angels (1969). 
Later, he suggests that "perhaps the multidimensionality of religious 
experience is an anthropological constant (1974a:l33), and that the 
sacred, as an ontological reality, breaches into human daily life from 
time to time (1974a:l29-131; 1976:9-12). This probably explains why 
Berger, in his later writings~ no longer speaks of the secularization of 
consciousness. 
Unlike Berger who seems to perceive in the experience of the sacred 
the intrusion of a pre-existing reality, Acquaviva considers the experi-
ence of the sacred rather as a pure psychological phenomenon (1971:273-283). 
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As such, it represents a structural component of human psychology, and 
it is, in its essential features, a patrimony of all human beings--at 
least, understood as an expression of human biopsychic structure (1971: 
66; 1973a:l0). The experience of the sacred may eclipse but can never 
vanish totally. "For Acquaviva," remarks Guizzardi (1977:388), "the 
experience of the sacred, in the sense of the radically other of R. 
Otto, constitutes an anthropological constant of his thesis of the 
eclipse of the sacred." 
As stated above, Wilson and Glock discuss secularization primarily 
in the context of Christian religion. For both, when Christian religion 
is discredited, the basic religious needs such as "psychic reassurances, 
fantasy outlet, affection, supernatural benefit, and special dispensa-
tions" (Wilson, 1971:268), and "the need for a system of ultimate mean-
ing" (Glock and Stark, 1965:306) are still to be satisfied. This is the 
reason why Glock speaks of "the gap of meaning" created by science that 
is yet to be filled {1976:366), and Wilson talks about the "anomaly of 
secularization" (1976a:76). He observes that secularization, by des-
troying community, affection, and irrationality, makes religion appear 
obsolete; yet, man remains partially irrational and cannot live without 
community and affection, implying that man still needs religion. 
The preceding analysis of the definitions of religion proposed by 
the leading contemporary sociologists of religion has shown that none 
of them can be called an exponent of the thesis of secularization with-
out qualification. Sociologists who work with an inclusive definition 
of religion, though they attack the concept of secularization, do use the 
term secularization in a particular context; some of them have even 
developed their own theories of secularization. On the other hand, those 
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sociologists who adopt an exclusive def:,i.nition of religion, while 
arguing in favor of the hypothesis of secularization, do not speak of 
the complete demise of religion. Thus, none of the concepts of seculari-
zation put forward by the leading sociologists of religion can be iden-
tified with the conventional idea of secularization which connotes the 
eventual end of religion. 
Causes of Secularization 
Whether a sociologist considers a factor as a cause of seculariza-
tion depends, first of all, on whether he is convinced that there is 
such a process called secularization. As indicated above, despite the 
modifications they made in the discussion of the conceptualization of 
secularization, sociologists committed to an inclusive definition of 
religion tend to reject the hypothesis of secularization, while those 
working with an exclusive definition are prone to defend it. The aim of 
this section is to clarify their respective positions on the alleged 
causes of secularization. In sociological literature, a variety of 
factors have been suggested as the causes of secularization, such as the 
Judea-Christian concept of God and nature, Greek reationality, humanism, 
science, education, industrialization, urbanization, mobility, differ-
entiation, and many others. Two--by far the most extensively discussed 
factors--are undoubtedly science and differentiation; the others, though 
often referred to, have seldom been subject of dispute. In the follow-
ing analysis, attention will be given exclusively to science and differ-
entiation. Needless to say, not all the sociologists selected in this 
study have equally participated in the discussion of both subjects. 
"' 
Science 
The popularity of the question whether the advance of science neces-
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sarily leads to the decline or the eventual death of religion has stimu-
lated, among contemporary sociologists of religion, not so much a debate 
as a variety of comments. Unlike their early counterparts, contemporary 
sociologists of religion are fully aware both of the intrinsic limita-
tion of the scientific outlook--and hence of its restricted impact on 
religion--as well as the significance of religion for human existence. 
Again, how they assess the relationships between science and religion 
hinges very much on their definitions of religion. 
For the sociologists who are in favor of an inclusive definition 
of religion, the growth of science does not weaken or demolish religion 
as such, although it may destroy a certain kind of religion. Thus, 
Yinger points out that "science disapproves specific religious beliefs, 
but it does not disprove religionn (1970:61). A particular religion may 
be destroyed because its beliefs and practices are incompatible with 
science; or its leaders, for various reasons, prevent the necessary 
adjustment. If, however, the existing religions of a society are 
rendered obsolete, new ones are bound to appear because, to Yinger, no 
society can survive without providing means for its members to cope with 
the ultimate problems (Yinger, 1970:61-62). He states: 
Religion in a scientific era will speak in a different 
idiom, it will develop new systems of ··overbeliefs' by 
means.~ of \vhich men struggle with the basic problems of 
life. But it is no more true to say that science destroys 
religion than it is to say that science destroys art. 
When new media of communication, new materials, new 
instruments are invented, science sets new conditions 
within which artistic life is carried on; it modifies the 
forms of expression; but it does not destroy the expres-
sive and creative process . 
• • . Of this we can be certain: by the growth of 
knowledge, religion will be changed, yet it will not be ~ 
destroyed (1963:182-183). 
vfuile Yinger focuses on the necessary adjustment of religion to the 
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new environment created by science, Parsons emphasizes the absence of 
theoretical clash between science and religion as such. Religion is 
concerned basically with the problem of meaning, the moral aspect of 
action, and the emotional adjustment to irrational discrepancies of 
existence, whereas science is interested only in empirically verifiable 
knowledge (1951:326-383). Bellah (1970:242-248) carries Parsons' argu-
ment further that not only science and religion do not have to conflict 
with each other, but they can also be integrated: 
When I speak of integration I do not mean some kind of 
fantastic syncreticism of science and religion. They have 
different purposes, different limitations, different modes 
of action. But they are both part, and I would argue a 
necssary part, of every culture and every person. They need 
to exist in some vital and healthy whole in which each is 
integral. This means not simply a tacit agreement to ignore 
each other but open interchange between them with all the 
possibilities of mutual growth and transformation that·. 
entails (1970:244) 
Greeley (1972a:l5) argues along the same line that science cannot be 
regarded as a substitute of man's mythological need but as its supplement. 
He also points out that it is true that science has removed many mysteries 
of the world but it has, at the same time, also discovered many new ones, 
which need no less ultimate, thus religious, interpretation than in the 
previous eras of human history (1972a:55-83). Indeed, "as long as rational 
science cannot cope with the basic questions religion is designed to cope 
with, this !the scientific achievement] is of itself essentially a trivial, 
at least, as far as religion is concerned" (1972a:l4). 
Martin (1969:116) observes that even though science has increased 
the general sense of human power, each particular person still feels the 
threat of contingency and thus the need for religion. He think~ that 
"maybe the lack of individual power contributes to the massive survival of 
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beliefs in fate, in luck, in a moral homeostasis and in superstitions of 
every kind" (1969:117). He remarks further that scientifically sophisti-
cated societies such as America "are capable of living by belief systems 
emotionally and intellectually crass to the point of nausea" (1967:114). 
Reflecting Bellah's idea, Martin notes that "there remains in man a 
perennial urge to fit the scientific achievement (and the scientific 
threat) into a framework of over-all religious meaning such as vulgarized 
Marxism provides in communist countries" (1967:115). 
Luckmann seems to criticize the idea that science will necessarily 
demolish religion from the standpoint of sociology of religion. He 
regards science and religion as but two among many socially constructed 
symbolic universes (Berger and Luckmann, 1967:40). As such, there is no 
empirical basis to decide that one is better than the other. This is propably 
why Luckmann, speaking of science and church-oriented religion, remarks 
that it is "sociologically downright naive" to believe that the various 
types of faith in science is inherently superior than the church religion 
and one will necessarily retreat as the other advances (1967:38). 
These sociologists, critical of the concept of secularization, tend 
to discuss the impact of science on religion in terms of religion tout 
court, taking for granted, or paying little attention to its effect on 
particular religious systems. Science, according to these sociologists 
of religion, does not cause religious decline, let alone religious demise, 
be it because science cannot eliminate man's ultimate concerns, or 
because science and religion are not incompatible, or because science's 
deadly impact on religion is not generally felt, or, finally, because 
science is not superior than religion. Thus, as long as man lives, there 
will, according to these sociologists, always be religion in one form or 
another .. 
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For the sociologists who take the sacred or the supernatural as the 
central variable of religion, science, as the epitome of the process of 
rational disenchanted endeavor, does constitute a contributing factor to 
religion's decline, if not its demise. 
O'Dea (1956; 1966:85-86; 1969:103-109; 1971) sees science's threat 
to religion essentially in its problem-solving mentality which tends to 
claim to be able to solve any problem, though it is intrinsically incapable 
of answering the most fundamental problems of meaning. "It tends to dis-
solve the basic notions of religious thought as myth in the pejorative 
sense of the word." (1969:108-109) Elsewhere, he states that science 
introduces a reductionist frame of mind that tends "to make religion itself 
appear a strange phenomenon and one demanding rational explanation: (1971: 
328). Thus, according to O'Dea, science, being anti-religious in its basic 
orientation, has created a severe religious crisis; but, being unable to 
eliminate the fundamental religious needs, it cannot destroy religion. 
Wilson holds that science per se cannot represent a rival to 
religion because science is concerned with means, and religion with end 
(1969:78), but the real danger of science to religion is its growing 
prestige as an institution that has created a mentality that what can-
not be scientifically accepted cannot be religiously reassuring (1969:18), 
and "science is more reliable and more valuable than religion" (1969:67). 
According to Acquaviva (1960:221; 1971:217-219), science does cause 
secularization. Science, he maintains, has transformed our logic as 
evidenced in the transformation of our language. A-religious terms have 
gradualy replaced religious ones, an indication that a-religious thinking 
.... 
has also replaced religious thinking. Indeed, science has changed our 
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standard o:f judgment. Att~pt a,t adjul:ltment made by ~eligion p~acti.cally 
led always to secularization. 
Our logic is thus. l)larked by concepts deJ;""iyed fJ;""OI!l the 
recent technological and scienti:Uc reyolut:i,.on. At thi_s 
point, when the paJ;""ameters of judgment o;f nea;rly 9,ll men 
have been substantia,lly changed, a negative interpJ;""etation 
of religious phenomena becomes ~asier. ~t is not. the caf?e 
that the majority finds itself deprived of paJ;""~eters of 
judgment which are sens;itive to religious phenomena~ once 
these parameters have been eliminated frQlll~odern logic? 
Naturally, all this leads to a religious lag in relat:i..on 
to science. Efforts at ass:bllilat:i.on-,..·rarely successful~..-. 
in practice lead to secularization of the sacred rather 
than to assimilation by science and technology of 
religious elements (1960:221}. 
Li.ke Luckmann, Berger (Berger and Luckmann, 19.67; 40} believes that 
the scientific world view is no better than any other world yiew; hence, 
the real cause of seculari.zation should not be sought in scientific 
thought, but in everyday experience: 
The causes of secularization must be sought, primarily, 
not in movements of ideas (such as the influence of modern 
scientific thought) but in concrete social experiences. 
Thus a prime secularizing force is not the abstract ration-
ality of science or philosophy, but the 'functional ration-
ality' (a Weberian term) of modern capitalism bureaucracy, 
and industrial production. The social formations of 
modernity bring about habits and mind-sets which are 
unfavorable to the religious attitude. They encourage 
activism, problem-solving, this worldliness, and by the same 
token they discourage contemplation, surrender, and a 
concern for what may lie beyond this world. But simply, 
modernity produces an awful lot of noise, which makes it 
difficult to listen to the gods (1976;11}. 
Preoccupied with Christian religion in America, Glock, in his dis-
cussion of secularization, shows little interest in the relationship of 
science and religion as such. Glock (1972, 1976; Glock and Stark, 1965: 
289-306) does acknowledge that science cannot prove or disprove the 
'< 
existence of the supernatural, but he perceives an irresolvable conflict 
between scientific and Judea-Christian assumptions about nature and man. 
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While the basic assumption of science is that every event or human action 
is determined by antecedent factors, the fundamental belief of Judea-
Christian religion is that God intervenes in natural events, and that 
roan is essentially free in his actions. Although science does not 
eliminate religion, because the existence of nature, universe, and man-
kind remain unexplained, hence there will always be a warrant for the 
supernatural, it does affect the "saliency of religion'' by having proved 
that human behavior, including religious practice and commitment, are, in 
a large measure, a result of his social context. With the progress of 
science, God may then appear iess and less relevant to everyday life. 
If what can be attributed to God's will is made 
narrower and narrower, and if man's accountability for his 
actions is found to be more and more circumscribed, religion 
seems destined to lose much of its power to inform and guide 
the human condition (Glock and Stark, 1965:306). 
As expected, the foregoing analysis has shown that the leading 
sociologists of religion do not hold that science will ever be able to 
demolish religion. · While the sociologists taking an inclusive approach 
to the definition of religion believe that the advance of science can-
not cause either decline nor end of religion, the sociologists taking an 
exclusive approach argue that, as science progresses, religion looses in 
relevancy. 
Differentiation 
The discussion of differentiation as an alleged contributing factor 
of secularization centers on the question whether functional differentia-
tion causes reduction or even loss of religious influence as an over-
arching legitirozation system. All sociologists of religion agree that 
... 
differentiation does not eliminate religion on personality level, but 
they disagree on the role of religion on institutional and societal levels. 
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Parsons maintains that functional differentiation does not undermine 
religion as an over-arching legitimzation system, but-only causes its 
values to be generalized to higher levels. As indicated above, Parsons 
sees religion primarily as the ultimate value that stands on the highest 
level in the cybernetic hierarchy of control, defining, in universal 
terms, the patterns of desirable orientation for the entire society. 
Analytically, he believes that religion as value, is uindependent of the 
internal differentiation of the system" and is "relevant on the level of 
generality which 'transcends' functional differentiation" (1965a:43-78). 
When functional differentiation takes place, what is concomitantly differ-
entiated is, according to Parsons, norm which specifies concrete func-
tional performances, not value. Value can be modified and generalized 
but it cannot be differentiated. Norm is "function-specificn (1965a:43) 
and legitimated by value; it operates on "lower level of generality with 
respect to expected concrete collective and role performance" (1965a"43), 
while value is "independent of the specification of situation or of 
differentiated function within the system" (1965a:44). For example, in 
the modern United States, the process in which religion, government, 
education, economy and other major institutions have become differentiated 
and specialized, has coincided with the development of a more generalized 
religious orientation, which is distinct from any particular denomina-
tional tradition. Although religious institutions are no longer allowed 
to claim universal religious jurisdiction over the whole society, the 
common, societal values are still values that are derived from Christian 
religion. Parsons urges that distinction should be made "between a 
generally legitimate religious orientation and the particularities of a 
specific denominational position" (1965b:25). The process of differen-
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tiation is accompanied by the process of value-genera,liza,tic;m, which, as a 
modification of value, ha,a been called secula~ization (Gla,sne~, 1976:35). 
But, for Parsons, value-generalization i.s concomitant -with the incluE;ion 
and the upgrading of the aecular. I.t is the religious upgra,ding o:f; the 
secular which, as stated above, should be emphasized in the discussion of 
secula~ization according to Parsons., not the value-gene~a,liza,tion.. lf 
Parsons calls the whole di:J;ferentiation-value generalization upg~ading-
inclusion process secula~ization (1971: 218-219) t diffe~entiation ca,n s.till 
be said to be the antecedent condition o:t; theupg~ading p~ocess, the insti-
tutionalization of religious values. 
Luckmann, for whom both individua,l and society are axioma,tically 
religious, does mainta.in that diffe~entiation replacea ~eligion with func-
tional rationality in all majo~ dominant institutions. such a,s politics, 
economy, education, etc., as discussed ea~lier. He states: 
They {dominant institutions] lose their intimate relation 
to the transcendent symbolic universe. The traditiona,l legiti-
mation from 'above'· (the ethic of vacation, divine ~ight of 
kinds) is replaced by legitimation from '-within •, i._e.,_, by 
refe~ence to the sheer rati.onal efficiency of the institution. 
I.n this sense the norms o:t; the autonomous institutional spheres 
are becoming increasingly 'secular' (1963;160). 
As an energetic critic of Parsons' view, Fenn (1970, 1972, 1973) carries 
Luckmann' s argument further by saying tha,t "differentia,ted s.ociety under-
mines the possibility of a single normative order, let alone a roora,l con-
sensus which is explicitly religious in content (1973:345}. .. 
ln evaluating the theoretical positions of Parsons and Luckmann, 
Greeley remarks: 
The question is, to a very considerable extent, one 
of fact, and the data are not available for us to judge 
the fact. My hunch is that the truth probably lies some-
where in between the two positions, leaning more heavily 
toward Parsons than toward Luckmann (1969:85). 
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Thus, sociologists advocating for an inclusive definition of religion 
do not agree whether functional differentiation drives away religious 
influence from non-religious institutions. While Luckmann believes that 
functional rationality completely undermines religious legitimation in 
major non-religious spheres, for Parsons, functional norms are still 
legitimated by religious values. 
Sociologists who are in favor of an exclusive definition of religion 
tend to agree with Luckmann's position. Thus, Wilson (1976a, 1976b) 
insists that modern differentiated societies have shifted from being moral 
orders to being technical ones: 
Modern societies have ceased to depend upon an integrated 
consensus of values as the basis of their cohesion. Society, 
as distinct from the agglomeration of connnunities that in the 
past made up the larger entity loosely referred to as ~society~, 
is a coherent, large-scale integrated system, held together by 
techniques and procedures not by values. Culture, in advanced 
societies, ceases to be integrative: it becomes a supernumerary 
item, as society shifts from being a moral to being a technical 
system (1976b:ll3). 
Indeed, "modern social organization implies secularity" (1976a:259), and 
the cannons of rationality that organize modern institutions are offensive 
to the spirit of religion which emphasizes love, affection, and other non-
rational concerns (1976a:273). 
Berger points out that "the concentration of religious activities 
and symbols in one institutional sphere .•• , ipso facto defines the rest 
of society as 'the world', as a profane realm at least relatively removed 
from the jurisdiction of the sacred'' (1967 :123). Elsewhere he remarks: 
Religion fulfills the function of symbolic integration _ 
by supplying values and cognitive interpretations that form 
a sort of overarching canopy for all of the institutions 
This function is radically transformed as modern society 
emerges. Religion becomes less and less capable of furnishing 
overarching symbols for the full range of social institutions 
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• • . this change of functionality is a logical consequence 
of the immense institutional differentiation of modern 
society. The old religious symbols can no longer be made 
to stretch, so to speak, to encompass the new range of insti-
tutions. Different institutional areas develop their own 
autonomous symbolisms, most of them having little or no 
relationship to the traditional religious ones (1967b:324). 
Hence, in one place, he defines secularization as "the process by which 
sectors of society and culture are removed from the domination of religious 
institutions and symbols" (1967a:l07). 
Although O'Dea did not deal with the process of differentiation 
theoretically, he did maintain that the emergence·of government, law, edu-
cation, economy, and other major social institutions ha$ contributed to 
the process of secularization of culture in which a non-religious world 
view has crowded the religious one into the sphere of private experience 
and has become the mode of thought in the public sphere, which is nothing 
but another way of stating Luckmann's theory of secularization (1966:80-
90; 1969:42-120). 
In his discussion of religion's integrative power in modern differ-
entiated society, Glock (1960) directly addresses himself to the question 
of the definition of religion: " if we define religion as a 'sacred' 
or ultimate commitment to some set of norms, values, and beliefs, then 
religion is indeed essential to social integration~t (1960: 57); but, he goes 
on to say that "institutionalized religion is not essential to social 
integration; theoretically, a high degree of social integration may exist 
without it" (1960: 57). He believes tha.t institutionalized religion can 
integrate society only if the supra-social authority is granted precedence 
over other forms of authority; if supra-social, social, and legal authority 
..... 
support the same values; if the society in question is ruled by tradition; 
and if consensus exists in the religious community (1960: 58). In modern 
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societies, he says, "this capacity of religion to inform the secular 
normative structure seems to be largely a thing of the pas.t'l. (1960:59), 
and organized religion does no longer inform the secular but is informed 
by it (1960:59-60). 
Thus, sociologists who choose to define as religion any consensus or 
common value tend to reject the contention that differentiation is a cause 
of secularization, while those who adopt a narrow definition of religion 
agree that differentiation does remove religious influence from the major 
institutional sectors. However, whether differentiation is a cause of 
secularization or not, sociological researches have :f;ound and continue to 
find "the religious factor'' in various major institutional spheres as 
evidenced in many textbooks of sociology of religion •. 
The Future Course of Secularization 
Predicting the future fate of religion is a dif:f;icult task and can 
often cause embarrassment. Speaking of the past predictions of the 
religious demise, Greeley remarks that , .. the prediction has generally been 
wrong every time it has been made'·' (1969: 6). Similar statements can be 
made about the predictions of a brighter future of religion. Lenski's 
anticipation of "the rising rates of church attendance in American society" 
and "the strengthening of socio-religious group communalism" (1961:325) is 
but a recent example. Yet, in interpreting religion's past and present 
situations, sociologists of religion are often tempted to make some pro-
jections about its future development. 
How a sociologist foresees the future trend of secularization depends 
obviously upon how he evaluates the alleged causes of secularization, which 
is, in turn, related to the definition of religion. The purpose of this 
section is to attempt to point out the discrepancies among the leading 
sociologists of religion in projecting the future direction of secularization. 
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The sociologists working with an inclusive definition tend to predict 
that there will be religion as it has always been, though a particular 
form of religion may disappear. 
According to Yinger (1970:532-534; 1971:29), since the modern world 
is "desupernaturalized," existing traditional religions will unlikely play 
a vital part in man's religious life in the future; instead, partly from 
the sectarian protest against the established religion partly from religi-
ous innovations, and partly from the synthesis of some of quasi-religions 
such as Communism, Freudianism, Positivism, and many others there will 
develop new religions. "Or they will fail to come, the world will be 
shattered" (1970:533). 
While acknowledging that even in the most advanced society, primitive, 
archai:c, and all kinds of imaginable religions will coexist, Bellah (1968) 
believes that the dominant type of religion in the post-dualistic society 
will be the ''personalist and individualist but not asocial and apolitical" 
(1968:227). With increasing education, he explains, man no longer accepts 
blindly any religion handed down from the past, but seeks to work out his 
own ultimate problems by himself. But, this does not mean that such a 
religion will, as Luckmann (1967:117) fears, be selfish; instead, it will 
be politically involved and socially conscious. 
Conceiving the past socio-religious development as a differentiation-
value-generalization-upgrading-inclusion process, Parsons (1963, 1966a, 
1971, 1974) does not see why the same process should stop in the future. 
Rather, he perceives that a world society informed by Christian value is 
in the making. In the lVest, he notes, what, from the religious point of 
view, has for nearly two centuries been defined as the most subversive 
movement, namely materalistic rationalism, now seems to be in the course to 
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be included within Christian value sustem (1971:231); and worldwide, for 
the first time in history, Christianity is now involved in a deep con-
frontation with the major religions in the Orient as well as the modern 
political religion of communism, and, through the upgrading-inclusion 
process, Christianity will, he envisions, eventually bring the whole 
world into its fold. 
Martin (1976a) observes that modern societies, capitalistic as well 
as Marxist, cannot manage without religion. Both technical rationalism 
and political materialism have been unable to solve personal existential 
problems, and thus, he predicts that, in the future, religion will survive, 
not only in the West, but also in the East. Speaking of the world's "high 
religions," Martin (1969:5-6) believes that the basic religious orienta-
tions in the world, limited in number, will always remain as fundamental 
alternatives; they will not be "eroded as rationality disenchants the 
world but remain as the permanent structure of options" (1969:6). 
For Greeley (1969, 1972a, 1972b, 1973, 1974), there will be no 
drastic religious change in the future. Man is by nature "unsecular" 
(1972a). Contrary to Bellah and Luckmann, he does not foresee that insti-
tutional religion will lose members or importance, nor will the doctrinal 
orthodoxy collapse, although they will probably change in emphasis such as 
more concern with the democratic religious organization, the non-rational, 
religious responsibility of the individual, intimate fellowship congre-
gation, and more explicit articulation of religious myths (1969:16-75; 
1972a:263). "To talk about 'institutionaless' religion is," he says, "at 
best naive romanticism" (1972a: 241). 
Having developed the thesis that functional differentiation has dis-
placed religion from its role as a major public institution into a 
;(~;c;· ~-~ 
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voluntary association in the private sphere, Luckmann, in his speculation 
about the future of religion, is understandably interested in the possi-
bility of the re-emergence of religion as an overarching symbolic universe 
such as it was in the middle ages or archaic societies (1971, 1972). He 
believe that the supernatural religion will not disappear, the traditional 
religion will persist, and "the death of God" talk is nonsense; but he 
does not think that an overarching religious system will ever be possible 
again, because the functional autonomy of the major social institutions 
will preclude the re-emergence of such a religion; besides, in modern 
societies religion is no longer part of the general socialization. Thus, 
in highly differentiated societies religion has to take a private form and 
remain invisible, so to speak. 
Sociologists who prefer an exclusive definition of religion are more 
cautious and less optimistic about the future development of religion, 
although none of them foresees the end of religion. In his early works 
(1967a, 1969), Berger insisted that the process of secularization is 
unlikely to reverse itself in the future, but, in his later writings 
(1971, 1974, 1974b, 1976), he has modified his position, even though he 
still maintains that the hypothesis of secularization as an interpreta-
tive scheme is valid for explaining the past and present religious situa-
tions (1971:66-67). In a recent work he talks about his position on the 
future of religion as follows: 
In the last few years I have come to believe that many 
observers of the religious scene (I among them) have over-
estimated both the degree and the irreversibility of secu-
larization. There are a number of indications, to para-
phrase Mark Twain, that the news about the demise of 
religion has been exaggerated. Also, there are signs of ~ 
a vigorous resurgence of religion in quarters where one 
would have least expected it (as, for instance, among the 
college-age children of the most orthodox secularists). 
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All this needs not mean that we are on a brink of a new 
Reformation (though I doubt if anyone thought they were on 
the brink of a Reformation at the beginning of the six-
teenth century either), but it seems increasingly likely 
to me that there are limits to secularization. I am not 
saying this because of any philosophical or theological 
beliefs about the truth of the religious view of reality, 
although I myself believe in this truth. Rather, I am 
impressed by the intrinsic inability of secularized world 
views to answer the deeper questions of the human condition, 
questions of whence, whether, and why. These seem to be 
ineradicable and they are answered only in the most banal 
ways by the ersatz religions of secularicism. Perhaps, 
finally, the reversibility of the process of secularization 
is probable because of the pervasive boredom of a world 
without gods. 
This does not necessarily mean, however, that a return 
to religion would also mean a return to the churches. It 
is perfectly possible that future religious resurgences 
will create new institutional forms and that the existing 
institutions will be left behind as museum pieces of a 
bygone era (1974b:l4-15). 
In evaluatingthe present religious stiutation in the West, O'Dea 
(1968, 1969, 1971) consistently speaks of religious crisis, urges religious 
leaders to adjust religion to the changing socio-cultural environments, and 
is rather pessimistic about the future of religion. However, in a book on 
religion in general (Comstock, et al., 1971) of which O'Dea is a co-author, 
we find a less gloomy prognosis about the future fate of religion: 
The evidence at the moment is mixed. Some forms of 
religion are declining; others flourishing to a remarkable 
degree. In this connection we must be careful to dis-
tinguish between the continued vitality of personal religion 
--an individual's religious orientation--and the decline of 
importance of the institutional forms of religion. It is 
true that at the present time some institutional forms of 
religion have experienced a period of decline, but even this 
fact must be qualified: Some Eastern religions have acquired 
new vitality with the emergence of modern nationaiistic 
attitudes. Furthermore, all institutions have their periods 
of growth and decline, which often take a cycle pattern. A 
decline at the moment may well be countered by a resurgence 
in the future. 
Even if it is true, however, that religion is declining 
in its institutional form, we must recognize that the future 
of religious activity in the life of man and the future of 
religious institutions are two distinct things. It is possible 
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that in a future ·world in \vhich religious institutions have little 
influence on the political, economic and scientific activities of 
man, large numbers of men might still pursue forms of religious 
practic and symbolism that are less structured and socially 
coerced than has been the case in the past (Comstock, et al., 1971: 
626). 
Like other sociologists of religion, Acquaviva (1968; 1971:251-306; 
1973b) does not foresee the complete disappearance of religion as such in 
the post-industrial society, but he is more pessimistic in assessing the 
future trend of the present secularization process. As indicated above, for 
Acquaviva, the secularized man ceases to use religion magically but does not 
cease to have the experience of the sacred. Thus, in the secularized, 
post-industrial society man will still have religion even though he will 
have a different experience of the sacred and a different "image of God" 
from what he has today (1968; 1971:283-300; 1973b; Acquaviva and Guizzardi, 
1971:40-44). In other words, there will be a new, secularized religion. 
But, when he comments on the future trend of the present secularization 
process in the West, he insists that secularization, as a concomitant of 
the essential development of industrial society, is hardly going to stqp in 
the future. 
Anyhow, it appears evident that there is a process of seculari-
zation and a vast impoverishment of the sacred and religiosity; 
according to the present state of research and the facts we have, 
it is difficult to say when it is going to terminate. The data in 
our possession make one think that there will hardly be, in the 
near, even relatively remote, future, a substantial reversal of 
the present trend (1971:306). 
Speculating about the future destiny of religion in America, Glock 
(Stark and Glock, 1968) does not predict the end of religion as such but 
he believes that traditional Christian religion is on its way out and we 
may well be entering a post-Christian era. In a book he wrote together 
with Stark we read the following: 
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The evidence leads us to two conclusions: the religious 
beliefs which have been the bedrocks of Christian faith for 
nearly two millennia are on their way out; this may very 
well be the dawn of a post-Christian era (Stark and Glock, 
1968:205) 
But later, we find a more cautious comment: 
This is hardly to suggest that religion itself will die. 
Clearly, so long as questions of ultimate meaning persist, 
and so long as the human spirit strives to transcend itself, . 
the religious quest will remain alive. But whether or not 
the religion of the future is in any sense Christian remains 
to be seen. Clearly, it will not be if one means by Christian 
the orthodoxy of the past and the institutional structures 
built upon that theology. But if one can conceive of 
christianity as a continuity in a search for ethics, and a 
retention of certain ~raditions of language and ritual, 
perhaps Christianity will remain alive. 
The institutional shape of the religion of the future 
is as difficult to predict as its theological content. 
Conceivably it may take on a public character, as suggested 
recently by Robert Bellah, or the invisible form anticipated 
by Thomas Luckmann. Or it may live on in a public witness 
conducted by priests without parishes similar to religions 
in Asia. Quite possibly, religion in the future will be 
very different from anything we can now anticipate (Stark 
and Glock, 1968:223-224). 
In his assessment of the future fate of Christianity, Wilson indicates 
that secular society no longer has direct respect for Christian religion, 
but it is too early to say that it could function without it as its values 
and orientations have been derived from the Christian past (1969:261). 
Nevertheless, he says, traditional Christian religion is incapable of 
expressing and accommodating man's ultimate concerns today, and new religi-
ons may be expected to emerge to take its place. Since modern social 
structure, being rationally and technically organized, cannot tolerate 
religion in its public sphere of operation, new religions virtually have 
to develop in the private sphere where "private individuals may experi-
ence their religious dispositions, gratifying their interests in the super-
natural and work out dependency relations that are unsustained in the rest 
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of their social experience (Wilson, 1971:268). 
Thus, contemporary sociologists of religion, whether committed to 
an exclusive or an inclusive definition of religion, are all in agreement 
that religion as such will not disappear in the future. While some are 
less favorably disposed toward the fate of institutional religion, others 
are more cautious in their predictions. In different degree, all leading 
contemporary sociologists of religion do not envision a very bright future 
for all the existing traditional religions. 
Summary 
This section has been an attempt to point out the impact of the 
definitions of religion as proposed by the leading contemporary sociologists 
of religion on their interpretation of the nature, causes, and future course 
of secularization. It has been shown that sociologists working with an 
inclusive definition of religion hold that there cannot be such a concept 
of secularization seen as the decline or demise of religion per se, 
although they do use the term secularization to describe changes of a 
particular form of religion, notably Christianity, or the removal of 
religious influence from certain institutional sectors of society. This 
is the reason why the conventional notion of secularization that suggests 
the eventual end of religion has been variously labelled as myth, dogma, 
ideology, or the like. Sociologists adopting an exclusive definition of 
religion do maintain that secularization is taking place even if it is 
understood as the decline of religion tout court, although none of them 
entertains a concept of secularization that suggests the total disappear-
ance of religion. 
Because of these divergencies of view on the conceptualization of 
secularization, the leading contemporary sociologists of religion differ 
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also in their assessment of the many factors that have been cited as the 
causes of secularization. Sociologists opting for an inclusive definition 
of religion tend to deny that there is any factor which can justly be 
called a cause of secularization per se simply because, according to these 
sociologists, secularization per se does not exist, although they do 
acknolwedge that many factors have contributed to the decline or fall of 
many particular religious traditions. Sociologists using an exclusive 
definition of religion do maintain that factors such as science and differ-
entiation have caused the decline of even religion as such, if not its 
demise. 
As to the future direction of secularization, sociologists adopting 
an inclusive definition tend to insist that religion will change and 
persist as it did always in the past, while sociologists choosing an 
exclusive definition are not in agreement. Some have already perceived a 
beginning of the reversal of secularization, others believe that the 
religious crisis and secularization will continue indefinitely. But they 
all concur that religion as such will never vanish. 
Just as the leading contemporary sociologists of religion do not 
agree on the meaning of secularization they differ in interpreting the 
significance and meaning of empirical materials pertinent to the issue of 
secularization, to which we turn in the next chapter. 
III, EMPIRICAL DIVERGENCES 
The previous section has been an qttel!lpt to clarify exclusively 
conceptual differences among the leading conte~porary sociologists of 
religion in the discussion of the issue of secularization. lt has b.een 
shown that the conflicting vi~ws on the occurrence, nature~ extent, and 
future course of secularization are, to a large extent~ the logical 
consequences of their respective definitional preferences. The object-
ive of this section is to point out how the leading contemporary sociolo~ 
gists of religion employ empirical data--understood in a broad sense of 
the term--to support, or to illustrate their claims and counter-cla~s 
with regard to the hypothesis of secularization. It focuses chiefly on 
the following three questions; How do they interpret historical data to 
back up their position? Do statistical materials and research data support 
the secularization hypothesis? And, does the emergence of the so-called 
new religions represent a counter-secularization trend? It is argued that 
the sociologists advocating an inclusive definition of religion tend to 
deny that the empirical data available support the secularization hypothesis, 
while the sociologists adopting an exclusive definition are more likely to 
argue that the empirical data do support it. 
Historical Data 
The very concept of secularization implies the assumption that 
society and individuals in previous ages were more "religious" than they are 
today. .. Are there historical data to substantiate this assumption? The aim 
' 
of this section is to analyze how the leading contemporary sociologists of 
religion approach this question. 
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For sociologists working with an inclusive definition of religion, 
the question whether people or society in the past were more "religious" 
than they are today would be meaningless, and to ask for historical 
evidence would be superfluous. As indicated above, for these sociologists 
religion is part of human condition, and society has a religious dimension; 
religion changes but does not decline. 
Yinger suggests that questions asking who is religious and who is 
not, how far secularization has proceeded, whether there is a return to 
religion, be set aside (1970:33); he even states that they are wrongly 
put (1970:488-489). For him, the history of Christianity in the western 
world is not a consistent decline, but a continuous adaptation, both in 
form and in content, to the changing experiences, values, and problems of 
its adherents (1970:482-507). In the course of history people have 
become differently Christian not less Christian. Parsons characterizes 
the history of the West as a history of the progressive institutionaliza-
tion of religious values, not the decline of religion (1963, 1971, 1974). 
The medieval synthesis, the Reformation, the emergence of denominationalism, 
and the new "expressive revolution" are seen as different phases in the pro-
cess of institutionalization of Christian values in society, not as various 
indications of a falling away from Christian commitment. 
For Bellah, religion evolves but does not decline (1970:20-50). As 
he interprets it, Western religion has evolved through primitive, archaic, 
historical, early modern, and modern stages. Each stage has created a 
new, but not a diluted form of religion. Religious symbolism has evolved 
from concern with the maintenance of personal, social, and cosmic harmony 
in the primitive and archaic religions, through the preoccupation with 
escape into the transcendental world in the historical religions, to an 
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active structuring of the world according to religious values in pre-
modern and modern times. This process of evolution is viewed as religious 
change, not secularization. Even the collapse of traditional doctrinal 
orthodoxy in modern world in not considered as a sign of secularization or 
religious indifference but as a result of the emergence of a new way of 
conceiving and practicing religion. Similarly, to Luckman~, the history 
of mankind has been marked by a series of social forms of religion, not by 
a steady decline of religion (1971, 1972). In archaic societies religion 
took a diffuse form, in traditional civilizations, an institutional form, 
and in modern societies, an invisible form. 
Martin argues that there is no unitary process of secularization. 
Religious institutions expand and decline for a variety of reasons, and 
even the same religious institution falls and rises for different reasons 
in different cultural and historical context (1969:14-17). The conven-
tional historical account of secularization is derived from organizing 
materials in terms of ideas of historical evolution rooted in retional-
istic and Marxist philosophy and from simplifying the complexity of 
history through contrasting pairs of concepts such as the magico-religious 
and the scientific, the sacred and the secular, and the like (1973:82-83). 
In his analysis of the history of Christianity in Western societies, 
Martin (1978) maintains that the outcomes of the English war, the American 
Revolution, the French Revolution, and the Russian Revolution have created 
different patterns of secularization in England, America, France, and 
Russia. Secularization in England is characterized by erosion of religious 
ethos and institutional participation; in America by erosion of religious 
' 
ethos; in France by massive religious beliefs, ethos, and institutions 
confronting massive secularist beliefs, ethos, and institutions; and in 
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Russia by massive erosion of religious beliefs, ethos, and institutions 
(1978: 7-8). 
Against the so-called "good old days" fallacy (Greeley, 1969:12), 
Greeley cited several historical evidences to prove that there is no 
ground for assuming that faith and morals in the middle ages were better 
than they ar·e today: 
In 1276, for example, the Cardinal Legate Simon de Brion 
threatened excommunications to all clerics and students who 
mocked at Jesus and Mary during the Mass itself and played 
dice on the altar--this presumably in the midst of an "age of 
faith." And those who speak of ·'sexual revolution" or of a 
"permissive society" should be asked a revolution from what 
and permissive in regard to what. One very much doubts morals 
are any more lax today than they were in the Versailles of 
Louis XIV, the London of the Restoration, or the Regency of 
the Salzburg of Archbishop Wulf von Dietrich (1970b:279). 
Elsewhere (Greeley, 1969:12-19), he cited anthropologist Geertz and 
sociologist LeBras to support the contention that the primitive people 
or early Christians were no more religious than modern men or modern 
Christians--a practice followed by many critics of secularization thesis 
(Brothers, 1973; Jackson, 1974; Towler, 1974, Glasner). 
As expected, sociologists employing an exclusive definition of 
religion tend to see the history of religion as a history of secularization. 
In his discussion of secularization, Wilson, as noted above, is con-
cerned mainly with the significance of religion in social order. What he 
contends is that religion was once socially more significant than it is 
today. Hence, to point out the persistence of private religions in modern 
society or the existence of individual irreligious in the past does not 
really invalidate his thesis (Wilson, 1969, 1971, 1975, 1976a, 1976b). 
Addressing himself to the question whether society and individual used to 
be more religious than they are today, Wilson states that 
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Religious thinking, religious practices and religious 
institutions were once at the centre of the life of western 
society, as indeed of all societies .••• 
In the twentieth century that situation has manifestly 
changed, and the process of change continues (1969:9-10). 
Describing the age of Innocent III, Wilson remarks that 
. . • life was effectively regulated, at least in its public 
concerns, by the demands of the Church. The Church controlled 
not only the moral fabric of society (perhaps that least of 
all), but the formal process of political, juridical, commer-
cial, and social intercourse--the institutional operation of 
society (1976b:9-10). 
Today, he goes on to say that 
Not only fewer people believe, but everyone knows that 
fewer people believe, and this very knowledge diminishes 
the credit of the Church. Despite impressive buildings, and 
established place in public life, and the dignity accorded 
to Church leaders, it becomes clear to all that the Church 
is losing its social significance (1976b:l5). 
Berger (1971) takes issue with the critics of secularization who con~ 
tend that in the a:bsence of scientific data from the past, we cannot say 
with any pretense of science that religiosity in the previous ages was 
more intense than it is today (Greeley, 1969:12, 22-23). He admits that 
there are no data on the past religious situation that can be compared with 
the data collected by social scientists today; but, he says, if one does 
not dismiss scientific rank from the materials gathered by historians, one 
is hardly overwhelmed by the argument, because there is a wealth of materials 
on the place of religion in Western societies in the past, materials not 
only from interpretation of the intellectuals but rather from sources like 
memoirs, letters, reports on actual events, legal documents, and the like 
that allow a good insight into beliefs and practices of common people of the 
time. He continues: 
... 
Once such materials are accepted as evidence, one is hard-
pressed to come to another conclusion than the one that the place 
of religion in consciousness and social life has become much 
smaller today. One needs only to consider the reports on the 
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daily life in the middle ages or, what lies much closer to us, 
the reports of Louis de Saint Simon on the life at the court 
of Louis XIV--let alone the reports on the daily life and 
beliefs of the peasants (1971:57). 
Acquaviva (1971:162) divides the history of social transformation 
into three phases: the first phase of social history is mainly a religious 
history; the second phase is a history of cooperation between society and 
religion; and the third phase is a history of desacralization of society. 
Speaking of dechristianization, he (1960) maintains that the decline of 
religion is mainly due to the coming of the city. Since the dawn of 
humanity, there have been rebels against all forms of religion, or at 
least organized religion, although on a lower scale than during the eight-
teenth and following centuries. "It was during the two hundred year 1970-
1950 that both the acceleration of urban development and the growth of 
irreligion took place (1960:210). 
While Parsons insists that the history of the relationship between 
Christianity and society has been "the development of the process of the 
'Christianizing' of the secular society: (1963: 44), 0 'Dea maintains that 
the history of the Western civilization has been the history of "a de-
Christianization" (1956:67) or, as he often calls it, the secularization of 
culture (1956, 1966, 1969). The history of the secularization of culture 
consists, according to O'Dea, of four basic processes: Judaism and Chris-
tianity, the Renaissance, the Reformation, and rise of science. Judaism 
and Christianity "de-divinized the world," the Renaissance "strove for a 
religion of affirmation of the world and of the intellect," the Reformation 
was "an attempt to find a Christian center gravity in a world of social and 
moral integration and national and intellectual innovation," and ''science 
attempts to make men "become the masters and possessors of nature (1956: 
57). Each process involves a further phase of desacralization and ration-
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Even without any data to show that the religious condition in the 
past was any better, Glock and his co-author Stark believe that the cur-
rent religious situation in America, especially the widespread doubt about 
orthodoxy, represents a "religious revolution" (Stark and Glock, 1968: 
205-224). 
• we have no certain evidence that fewer theologians a 
generation ago doubted traditional Christian doctrines. Nor 
can we prove that the forebearers of today's Christians were 
less inclined to doubt these doctrines. There is simply no 
reliable evidence on the state of faith in past times. Never-
theless, we are convinced that the widespread doubt of tradi-
tional Christian tenets is a recent development, that previous 
generations have been more prone to traditional convictions 
(Stark and Glock, 1968:206). 
Such kind of argumentation Greeley characterizes as "naive" (1969:65). 
Since we lack systematic, thoroughly documented historical data on 
the state of religion in the past, there is simply no way of establishing 
with certainty whether there has been a decline of religiosity or not. 
Historical material is notoriously difficult to analyze and subject to 
many biases. Out of a wealth of historical data evidences are often 
gathered to support conflicting views and certain prenotions without 
reporting the existence of data which may serve as counter-evidence. Too 
often, historical data which are just illustrative are selected to prove 
sweeping historical generalizations. The debate on the religiosity of the 
past ages is another example of the weakness and vulnerability of most of 
the analysis of historical material developed by sociologists. 
The New Religions 
The outburst of a bewildering array of the so-called "new religions" 
in the 1960 has stimulated, as expected, special interest among sociologists 
" 
of religion concerned with the issue of secularization. What is the sig-
nificance of these new religious patterns with respect to secularization? 
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Is it a counter-secularization movement or a further sign of secularization? 
The purpose of this section is to show how the sociologists with different 
approaches to the definition of religion evaluate the meaning of this new 
phenomenon. 
The sociologists adopting an inclusive definition of religion tend to 
see in the emergence of the new religions as a search for a new form of 
religion. Speaking of the necessity of formation of new religions to cope 
with modern situation, Yinger remarks about the contemporary youth move-
ments that "many elements of contemporary youth movements also seem to 
me, despite their nihilistic and anomie qualities, to express a profound 
search for sacred ideas and qualities. They are sensitive to the fact 
that new ultimate questions press in on man ..• " (1970:534). 
According to Parsons 1 the new }:el::i.~:i,Qus J!lOVement xepre~ent~ a beg;i.n..,. 
ning of an "expressive revolution," (1974:222), a harbinger ot' the emergence 
of a new type of religion that is in favor of the affective.,..expressive 
emphasis relative to the previous cognitive-rationalistic one. The themes 
of love and community in the new religions are seen to be legitimate socio-
cultural descendents of Christianity (1971;232-234). Speaking of the 
increasing acceptance of the legitimacy of non-western religions, Parsons 
makes the following comment: 
From one point of view ... , the new movement may be a 
kind of culmination of the trend of secularization we have 
traced which has sanctified, by inclusion, and moral upgrading 
component after component of what originally was conceived to. 
be the world by contrast with the spiritual order (1971;233). 
Bellah (1974, 1975, 1976) discerns in the ne~ movement an emergence 
of a new religious consciousness, an open, iconoclastic, non-rat~onal, 
experimental, and new \vay of g:rasping religious meaning. It is not a 
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counterc ulture, though not totally unrelated to it; "above all, it is a 
new way of being religious within modern culture and is not simple rejec-
tion of that. As a form of consciousness, it is not clearly institutional-
ized, although there is more than in the churches than perhaps is realized 
(1974:114-115). Moreover, Bellah interprets the new religious movement as 
an indication of "the inability of utilitarian individualism to provide a 
meaningful pattern of personal and social existence" (1976:339), and as a 
source of visions and ideals that hold promise for a broader cultural trans-
formation which can begin to repair the broken covenant. 
Greeley (1969:55-72; 1970a) does not consider the resurgence of the new 
religions as a counter-secularization, since there has never been seculariza-
tion, but as a protest against the hyper-rationalist society, and as a mul-
tiplication of new forms of religion. 
It is then, in my judgment, inaccurate to assume that 
some of the more recent and bizzare manifestations of 
religion and the sacred represent a 're-sacralization'. 
Society was never really 'de-sacralized' in the first place. 
What we are witnessing, I think, is rather the expansion of 
Thomas Luckmann's 'marketplace of interpretative schemes'. 
New forms of the sacred are becoming available in that 
marketplace, though at least some of them are in fact very 
old (1970a:204). 
Unlike Bellah, Martin (1974, 1976b) regards contemporary youth move-
ment as a counter-culture that struggles against "science, puritanism, 
industrial society, and utilitarian ugliness" (1966b:87) and describes it 
as "anarchic, morally deviant and experimental, aesthetically exploratory, 
mystical" (1976b:88). Elsewhere (Martin: 1974), he calls the student 
movement from Stockholm to New York "religious without institutionalization 
and dogmatic coherence" (1974:569). 
Sociologists working with an exclusive definition of religion tend to 
stress that the new religious movement is a further demonstration of the 
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decline or irrelevance of traditional religions, although they do not deny 
it as a search for meaning, community, and the like. 
In the Californian youth culture, Berger believes, "the basic 
religious sensibility" is "a kind of quasi-mystical, very anti-intellectual 
approach to reality" (1977a: 71). Speaking of the recent upsurge of pre-
occupation with occulticism, Berger states that "The current occult wave 
(including its devil component) is to be understood as resulting from the 
repression of transcendence in modern consciousnes: (1977b:209) and 
characterizes it as "a pronographic provocation ••• against the world 
view of modern secularity" (1977b:209) because like eating forbidden fruit, 
it provides libidinal pleasure, or more to the point: "modern man doing 
magic resembles a Puritan in a whorehouse" (1977b:208). 
Like Bellah, Acquaviva (1973a:l8-21) sees in the youth movement the 
emergence of new ways of being religious but he believes that this is 
because both secular theology and the established Church have failed to 
satisfy the religious need of the youth. 
Similarly, O'Dea (1969) regards the youth movement as a testimony of 
a profound religious crisis, a loss of "a sense of ontologically justified 
orientation," and the meaninglessness of the traditional religions. 
But malaise, reluctance to assume adult roles, loss of orienta-
tion, search for meaning and direction, rebellion against the 
adult society, a cult of experience and of the present--all these 
testify to the loss of meaning. All these testify that we witness 
a spiritual crisis. The incapacity of our spiritual and intel-
lectual leaders to offer meaning to these youth is a further 
testimony. The trumpet gives an uncertain sound, when indeed one 
can hear it at all (1969:162). 
The widespread exploitation and experimentation of alternative 
life styles among the youth is, according to Glock (1976) a visible symptom 
of a world view clash that has been going on for decades. Science has 
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undermined the traditional religious world view but is unable to provide a 
substitute itself; the hectic quest for the alternatives is a desperate 
effort to fill the void science has created. 
The most outspoken sociologist who insists that the new religions 
represent not the dawn of a new religious revolution but a widespread 
secularization is Wilson. New sects, he points out, "are themselves a 
feature of societies experiencing secularization, and they may be seen as 
a response to a situation in which religious values have lost pre-eminence 
(1969:207). Modern society is organized by rational, impersonal, and 
bureaucratic modes of control; as a result, "charismatic leadership 
persists only in the interstices between institutional orders, in the 
narrow social space that remains for collective behavior, spontaneous 
faith, and unconstrained obedience and adultaion" (1975a: 125). Comment-
ing on the hippies in the United States, Wilson says that "the central 
quest is the pleasurable search for the expanded mind, not the anguished 
search for objective religious truths" (1970:200). More recently, Wilson 
argued that the present upsurge of the novel religions should be viewed 
"as a confirmation of the process of secularization. They indicate the 
extent to which religion has become inconsequential for modern society" 
(1976b:96). Against those who see in the youth movement the persistence of 
religion he writes: 
The emergence of the new cult movements are not counter-
forces to secularization nor the likely seed-beds of an 
alternative culture. These cults, oversung as evidence of 
the persistence of religion by some who should know better 
but who today have perhaps no other religious song to sing, 
I regard as having a rather different significance. Their 
growth, transient appeal, decay, and eventual replacement by 
other enthusiasms, appear to me to be evidence of the trials 
of the human spirit in a world in which new techniques and 
increasingly rational procedures dominate man's social 
experience. They tell us that living in secular society is 
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painful, and they intimate modern man's permanent condition 
of bereavement at the loss of community. But they do not 
provide the basis for a new religious culture (1976b:viii). 
Elsewhere (1975b) he addresses himself even more directly to the issue of 
secularization: 
If we concede the abundance of sects and cults, does 
this create embarrassment for those who support the 
secularization thesis? I hardly think so. These movements 
thrive precisely because the culture is secularized: in a 
religious society they could scarcely arise, or, if arising, 
survive. They are themselves a religious response to the 
secularization of society, but they are essentially a 
marginal phenomenon (1975b:81~82). 
Besides, "secularization," he says, "is the major contemporary transforma-
tion of religion against which the cults are likely to be no more than 
transient and volatile gestures of defiance? (1976b:ll2). 
How one assesses the new religious movements depends very much on his 
own ideological predisposition and experiences. The different evaluations 
are, to a large extent, personal speculations and biases. Bell (1968:476-
488) calls them a cultural vogue of the decade, cultural experience expres-
sed in religious language, and escape from reality in search for fantasy. 
These interpretations are equally defendable as any one advanced above. In 
order to find out the significance of the new religious movements, Wuthnow 
(1976) examined thirteen new religious groups in San Francisco Bay and came 
to the following conclusion: 
The future of these movements, judging from the present 
data, in uncertain. On the one hand, they have garnered 
most of their support from the better educated and more 
intellectually aware, If there is something about these 
movements that is more compatible with the modern intellectual 
climate than traditional religion has been, they may prosper 
well into the future, especially as more and more people 
become educated. On the other hand, they seem to appeal most 
to youn~ people lvho are still at an unsettled stage in their 
lives. As these young people mature and become more settled, 
they may abandon these groups. Thus, the appeal of these 
groups v70uld be limited to new cohorts as similar stages in 
their life-cycles (1976:292-293). 
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Religious Statistics and Survey Researches 
The very concept of secularization implies a long-term phenomenon; 
but data on long term religious change are almost non-existent. Religious 
statistics and some survey studies are the only trend data that are avail-
able today. Religious statistics are notoriously subject to many errors 
and inadequacies, and the survey data are restricted to too short a 
period of time and, in some cases, to too small a population to justify 
any meaningful generalizations. These short comings and many more not-
withstanding, even some of the leading sociologists of religion who are 
interested in the issue of secularization have marshalled hard data, often 
not even trend data, to endorse their respective positions. This section is 
an attempt to indicate the ways in which these sociologists use church 
statistics or survey data to substantiate their views. Of course, not all 
sociologists we have selected are interested in quantitative empirical 
documentations. 
Some sociologists employing a broad definition of religion consider 
church statistics and survey data,being confined to church religion, to 
be incapable of measuring religiosity as such. Luckmann, (1960, 1967) 
although not the first to distinguish between religion and churches, is 
probably the first sociologist who has brought to attention the severe 
limitations of church statistics and most of recent researches in sociology 
of religion. He points out that underlying most, if not all, recent 
studies of sociology of religion is the assumption of identification of 
church with religion as such. It is this assumption, coupled with vestiges 
of the nineteenth century positivistic view of religion, that accounts for 
the current misconception of secularization that characterizes much of 
recent sociology of religion: diminution of church religiosity is auto-
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matically identified with the decline of religion as such--an entirely 
illegitimate inference. Luckmann's position has engendered a cohort of 
critics of the methodology prevalent among sociologists of religion on 
the same ground (Matthes, 1962a, 1962b; Vrijhof, 1969; Swanhorn, 1969; 
Gannon, 1972; Brothers, 1973; Glasner, 1976). Yet, he continues to say that 
in the absence of adequate researches on the place of religion as such in 
modern society, no one interested in theorizing can afford the luxury to 
disregard the abundant materials collected on church religion. Examining 
recent researches from America, France, and Germany, almost none of them 
trend data, Luckmann came to the conclusion that church religion has become 
a marginal phenomenon in modern society: 
Comparing the European and American findings on the social 
location of church religion and allowing for the differences in 
the character of church religion in European and American 
society we are led to the conclusion that traditional church 
religion was pushed to the periphery of 'modern' life in Europe 
while it became more "modern" in America by undergoing a 
process of internal secularization (1967:36-37). 
Yinger (1970:32-40) adopted a similar view when he speaks of cross-
cultural measurements of religious behavior. The problem of definition, 
he says, merges with the problem of measurements. A serious difficult 
associated with virtually all efforts to measure religion is the limita-
tion of the dimensions or scales to a few clearly related religious 
traditions. This puts a limit on any effort to develop generalizations 
about the relationships between religion and society that have cross-
cultural validity. Furthermore, they measure what religion one has 
dropped off, but not what one has picked up. 
Most importantly, if one's measurements use a criterion 
the degree of acceptance of traditional form of belief and' 
practice, one is confronted with a serious problem of dis-
tinguishing between religious change and religious decline. 
And one is likely to miss completely the more ephemeral, 
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the emergent, or the poorly institutionalized expression of 
ultimate concern (1970:32). 
Speaking of British religious practice, Martin (1967:34-51) shares 
Wilson's conclusion that there has been a general tendency of decline in 
baptisms, confirmations, and attendance as shown in religious statistics; 
but he warns that the interpretation of church statistics should take into 
account the widespread religious interest in the audience of radio and 
television (on any given Sunday about 24 per cent of the adult population 
see BBC religious programs and about 18 per cent lTV religious programs), 
and the participation in a multitude of ancillary organizations. (At 
least four persons out of five seem to feel that religion should be 
passed on in these various ways to children.) Furthermore, he suggests 
that the constant use of the word "decline" should be set against massive 
demographic fluctuations, which often show that the real source of the 
decline is other than religious and against the striking resilience of 
the church under the accelerating changes that erode traditional institu-
tions of any kind. He also indicates that the large-scale institutional 
abstention of the working class does not necessarily mean that they are 
irreligious. He points out further disaffection from organized religion 
in the post-Restoration era, religious indifference as well as heresy in 
London, and church absence of the lowest social strata in the seventeenth 
century. Then he concludes: 
At any.rate the important and massive fact remains that 
with every incentive to spend time in an alternative manner 
one quarter of the population is in church at least once a 
month. And even if one allows for some tendency to exagger-
ate attendance on the part of those interrogated, that 
exaggeration is in itself significant. . . . 
if we expect some mild erosion of the more conventiohal 
rites of passage and the special difficulties of non-conform-
ists, the position seems to have been almost stationary since 
the war (1967:50-51). 
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With regard to beliefs and attitudes, Martin (1967:52-76) indicates 
that the figures which suggest the smallness of the orthodox minority 
deserve cautious interpretation. There are many different possible com-
binations of beliefs apart from the orthodox which equally have their 
own internal logic: diversity is not necessarily irreligion nor confusion. 
One should remember, he points out, that only one person in twenty is an 
explicit atheist and some one of ten atheists believes in immortality; 
faith in prayer is wide and deep even among the agnostics. (One person in 
three says daily prayers and only one person in four fails to teach prayers 
to children; besides, one person in six believes in hell, and as many 
believe in ghosts; a broad assent exists to what is perversely believed 
to be Christian morality such as do as you would be done by; attitudes 
toward religious observance show considerable variation according to the 
type of observance; compared with the politicians, the clergy have a 
surprisingly good image, and on social matters, the Church is believed to 
be losing influence but this is widely deplored, which is in itself 
significant.) To all these must be added the so-called subterranean 
theologies and a variety of superstitions such as belief in ghosts (one 
in six of the population believes in ghosts and one in fifteen says he 
has actually one), and faith in luck and devices (nearly half of the 
population has consulted a fortune teller, and four out of five read 
weekly horoscopes, though half of these describe it as a diversion). 
About the whole situation Martin remarks as follows: 
All such examples bear strongly on assumption about 
secularization, the impact of the age of science, the 
advent of human maturity and so on. They suggest that 
far from being secular our culture wobbles between a ~ 
partially absorbed Christianity, biased towards comfort 
and the need for confidence, and beliefs in fate, luck 
and moral governance incongruously joined together. If 
we add to these layers of folk religiosity the attraction 
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of Freudianism and of Marxist mechanics for segments of 
the intelligentsia, it is clear that whatever the diffi-
culties of institutional religion they have little con-
nection with any atrophy of the capacity for belief (1967:76). 
If Freudianism and Marxism are considered as religions, the concept of 
religion is broad indeed. 
To endorse his contention that there has been a persistence of 
religion rather than secularization, Greeley (1969, 1972a, 1972b) repeatedly 
cited a 1965 replication of the 1952 national study, a 1965 research by 
NORC on religious behavior of graduate students of the top twelve American 
universities, some other statistics and authors. The 1965 replication 
study shows that from 1952 to 1965 there had been almost no change either 
in basic doctrinal commitments or in membership and church attendance for 
American gentiles. Proportional orthodo~~ among the Jews--never as 
important for the Jews as for the gentiles, he emphasizes--seemed to be 
declining, while at the same time synagogue attendance was going up, as 
was affiliation with congregation. As for the youth, Catholic young 
people were more orthodox than their predecessors, and there were some 
minor signs of a downward trend among young Protestants, but, he noted, 
that "certainly not of such a magnitude as to allow us to believe the news-
paper accounts of the vast apostasy among the young" (1969:39). To dis-
count the importance of the very notable decline in American Catholics' 
willingness to accept the traditional teaching on birth control and 
respect for the clergy, Greeley remarks: 
thus far in the history of Catholicism in the United 
States, the changing attitudes toward the clergy and 
changing sexual morality have not affected either the basic 
doctrinal loyalty of Catholics or their organizational 
involvement. (One can presume that, certain Catholic ' 
leaders to the contrary notwithstanding, birth control and 
divorce are not at the center of the Catholic doctrinal 
system (1972b:l41). 
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Incidently, this remark seems to have been substantiated by a recent 
replication study of Greeley and associates (Greeley, et al, 1976:28-39). 
About these above mentioned findings, Greeley comments that "the data 
are admittedly thin. They do not prove that the secularization 
hypothesis is wrong but they certainly call it into considerable question" 
(1972b:l41). 
The 1965 ongoing NORC study of the religious behavior of the June 
1961 college graduates indicated that there was some erosion of church 
affiliation among the arts and science graduate students: 95 per cent of 
the students had been raised in affiliation with organized religion, but 
only 75 per cent still maintained a religious affiliation. It should be 
remembered, Greeley warned, that this loss, though a considerable one for 
the organized church, occurred among those young people where presumably 
the loss would be most massive and that, even here, the loss constitutes 
only a fifth of the population (1969:40-41). The same study showed that 
there was some erosion in weekly church attendance among the Protestant 
graduates, but "there was no evidence of a notable secularization of either 
the Catholic or Jewish respondents" (1969:42), and there was no major con-
flict between scholarship and religion. About these young Americans Greeley 
states: 
Our data may indicate that, while the crises of faith are 
more serious and more frequent than they were in the past, 
they are not yet necessarily the beginning of a loss of faith 
or departure from organized religion • . . 
The secularization hypothesis, therefore, is simply not 
substantiated by any of the empirical data available to us; 
neither is the hypothesis of grave crisis (1972b:l50). 
Speaking of the annual Gallup poll data on church attendance, Greeley 
.., 
makes the following observation: 
For reasons we do not understand, there are cyclical 
patterns in religious behavior, with upswings and downswings 
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apparently following each other at intervals of five to ten 
years. In any event, church attendance in the middle 1960's 
is higher than it was in the middle 1930's, and one would be 
as ill-advised to argue for a religious revival on the basis 
of those statistics as one would be to argue for a religious 
decline on the basis of shorter-range statistics (1969:49). 
The effect of an inclusive definition of religion in the argument of 
secularization is most apparent in the comments Greeley made on the low 
institutional participation in European countries. Although church 
membership and affiliation in European countries are less striking than in 
the United States, he says, the "basic convictions still seem to persist in 
great masses of the population" (1969:51), and "religious of some sort, 
however vague, seems to persist despite these problems" (1969:52). He then 
continues: 
One may write this off as a residue of the past or as a 
persistent superstition, but the important fact to remember 
is that the residue persists and so the superstitution, and 
persists in large segments of the population (1969:53). 
Elsewhere, he makes similar remark: 
I am merely arguing from the data that religion has 
managed to persistin the modern world, in some fashion 
or the other (emphasis mine)? despite forces of seculari-
zation and change which are alleged to be working with 
great vigor (1972a:l3). 
In citing other authors, Greeley seems to be highly selective and 
biased. For instance, he cited Lipset (1962) who, after examining all 
available denominational statistics, came to the conclusion that there has 
been no dramatic change in the pattern of religious life of Americans, to 
support his contention that there is no secularization; but, he failed to 
mention another, perhaps, the most detailed and extensive, analysis of 
American church statistics made by Demerath (1968) who has reached an 
.... 
opposite conclusion that "traditional religion is increasingly autonomous 
but decreasingly relevant" (Demerath, 1968:43). 
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Sociologists using an exclusive definition of,religion are inclined 
to argue that religious statistics and research data do provide evidence for 
the secularization hypothesis. Thus, Wilson (1969:21-22) maintains that 
although church statistics cannot measure the meaning, motivation, and 
strength of religion, nor the invisible, unorganized religion, they do 
supply some evidence of change in organized religious participation and 
churches' influence over ideas and activities of men. They can, therefore, 
offer some sort of index of secularization. Hence, what Wilson, through 
religious statistics, intends to prove in his discussion of secularization 
is not whether there is still religion in one form or another, rather the 
loss of influence of organized churches. After examining British church 
statistics on membership, attendance, baptisms, confirmations, Eastern 
communions, Sunday school enrollments, weddings, and burials, Wilson came 
to the following conclusion: 
There are two trends which can be discerned. The first is 
the diminution in religious practice over the period of sixty 
or seventy years in most forms of religious involvement which 
amount to more than one isolated ceremonials. The other is the 
diminution in religious participation over the life-cycle of 
the individual (1969:30). 
In an attempt to devaluate the relatively high figures on baptisms, confirm-
ation, wedding, and burial, Wilson states that if set over against the low 
figures of other religious participations, the figures cannot be said to 
represent religious sentiment but should be seen as just to provide "appro-
priate ceremonial for prestige and status enhancement at crucial stages of 
life cycle" (1969:39), and in many cases, as routine or superstition, which, 
for Martin and Greeley, as noted above, would be still considered as 
evidence for the persistence of religion. 
In addition, Wilson indicated that religious forces exercise now less 
influence over people's lives than they did, as manifested in the smaller 
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numbers who are involved in church work of one kind or another; in less 
time and attention given to religious thought and action; in proportion-
ally less religious publications as compared with secular publications; in 
smaller religious control over the means of communication, and so on. As 
for the large audience of TV and radio religious programs, pointed out by 
Martin, Wilson remarks that "we cannot be all sure that their level of 
attention is the same as that which prevails in church" (1966:25). 
To evaluate the whole British religious situation, Wilson say that 
although institutionally the organized religion still remains favorably 
placed, "there can be no doubt about the decline in church-going, church-
membership, sustained religious commitment, and the general standing of 
the Church in society" (1969:39). 
The statistically impressive religious participation in the United 
States was discredited by Wilson in a similar fashion in which he commented 
on the high figures on the rites of passage in Britain mentioned above. 
Adopting the now famous thesis of Herberg (1960), Wilson maitains that 
being religious in America is simply being American, having little to do 
with religiosity itself . 
• . . the American Churches have, in effect, if less explicitly, 
subordinated their distinctive religious values to the values of 
American society. Thus, though religious practice has increased, 
the vacuousness of popular religious ideas has also increased: 
the content and meaning of religious commitment has been accul-
turated (1969:122). 
To justify this interpretation, Wilson states that it is a gross fallacy to 
interpret statistical figures of different countries in the same way without 
taking into account the historical and cultural context in which the sta-
tistics exist (1969:118). 
Acquaviva is also aware that the experience of the sacred cannot be 
directly measured, but he maintains that the statistical figures can be 
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treated as indicative, approximate, and suggestive indirect index of the 
degree of religiosity (1970:76-81). As evidence of the vast impoverish-
ment of the sacred, Acquaviva (1971:92-147, 178-199) has collected a 
wealth of statistical data from all over the world including communist 
countries such as Russia, Romania, Yugoslavia, and even China. The data 
are restricted primarily to Catholicism, ranging from church membership 
and attendance through spiritual exercies to divorce and illegitimate 
birth rates; from trend data to simple reports. Some data are the very 
data which other sociologists use as evidence for high religiosity such as 
the high percentage of citizens in Western societies who still believe in 
God. 
Having presented these data, Acquaviva, without giving any attention 
to the lack of comparative data in the previous ages, simply states: 
To conclude, the cifers and reports presented so far 
appear to be enough to convince the reader of the fact 
that, without doubt, it is difficult not to sustain that 
adherence to the ecclesiastical religiosity, and, within 
certain limits, to any type of religious belief, even 
belief in God is increasingly weakening (1970:114). 
Such illegitimate conclusion appears even more puzzling when set against the 
great bulk of materials he cited from the French religio-geographic data 
and LeBras' (1963:449) insistence that all his work of sociology and 
history has been a protest against the idyllic image of Christians in the 
middle ages. 
Glock discussed the issue of secularization primarily in the context 
of the comment he and his associate Stark made on the dispute of the so-
called post-war religious revival in America (Glock and Stark, 1965:67-85) 
and their analyses of the 1963 Northern Californian regional survey on 
religion and anti-semiticism (Stark and Glock, 1968) and the 1958 NORC 
study on the graduate students of twenty-five American universities (Glock 
and Stark, 1965:261-288). 
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In the discussion of the religious revival they questioned the 
reliability of the religious statistics: "none of it actually is completely 
reliable although it is impossible to judge just exactly how reliable it 
is" (Glock and Stark, 1965:76). They also indicated that the indicators 
used are too crude and do not represent all dimensions of religion. 
Further, the data on high contributions and investments in church buildings, 
they said, may simply reflect the general prosperity and do not necessarily 
indicate religious fervor. Similarly, the increase in religious literature 
and commodities may just be a result of commercial fad that "religion was 
again in style" (Glock and Stark, 1965:78). Then they made the following 
comment: 
Actually, there is nothing in the literature that would 
constitute a serious and systematic defense of the seculariza-
tion hypothesis. Its advocates are likely to be clergymen, 
church administrators, theologians, or journalists, and where 
they have been social scientists they have tended to be 
oriented to qualitative rather than quantitative observation. 
The evidence which they cite tends to be neither systematic 
nor thoroughly documented. Their view of religion •.• is 
likely to be a circumscribed one, though in a different way 
from the views of the 'revivalists' (Glock and Stark, 1965: 
83). 
Nevertheless, after examining the Northern Californian data set 
against the data from the national sample provided by NORC in 1964, Glock 
and his associate did find some evidence of secularization going on in the 
United States. 
. . . perhaps the most important finding . . . is that the 
overwhelming proportion of Americans today do not adhere to 
a pristine orthodoxy. Less than a third overall were 
firmly committed to these three beliefs [belief in God, in 
the Devil, and in life after death], and only in the small 
Protestant sects were as many as half classifiable as highly 
orthodox. Indeed, 45 per cent of America's Protestants and 
46 per cent of the Roman Catholics fall in the bottom two ·-.. 
categories of the Orthodox Index. Thus, it is clear that 
"Old Time" Christian Orthodoxy in all its certainty is not 
the predominant religious perspective of modern America. 
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Whether Protestant or Catholic, the average American does not 
firmly retify this group of traditional doctrines. 
These findings raise the issue of secularization. A 
number of recent commentators have claimed that American 
religion during the twentieth century has become increasingly 
secularized; that the mystical and supernatural elements 
of traditional Christianity have been replaced by an 
increasingly skeptical and demythologized religious outlook. 
These data suggest that this has indeed occurred. While it 
is true that we have no comparable information on the 
religious beliefs of nineteenth century Americans, there seem 
compelling historical grounds for suggesting that the average 
mid-nineteenth century American Christian would have scored 
high on our Orthodoxy Index. If this assumption is warranted 
then it is clear that substantial changes have in fact taken 
place (Stark and Glock, 1968:63). 
As noted above, it is exactly this assumption that has been challenged by 
many sociologists, notably Greeley (1969, 1972a, 1972b). 
While Greeley (1969, 1972b) did not find any major conflict betltleen 
science and scholarship in the 1965 study on graduate students of the top 
twelve American universities, Glock and his colleague (Glock and Stark, 
1965:262-288) did find the deteriorating impact of science on religion in 
the 1958 study on the graduate students of twenty-five American universities. 
Among others, they found that religious affiliation and attendance at worship 
increases sharply as exposure to scientific scholarship decreases, and that 
scholarly ethos was negatively related to religious affiliation and attend-
ance (1965:279, 284). To the question whether lack of religious affilia-
tion means also lack of religious faith, Glock and his colleague replied 
that public opinion polls suggest that 
when an Awerican says he has n9 ~eligion he means he 
not only has no formal church affiliation~ but that he also 
~ejects' religiqus faith. Hence, while we haye no data on 
the religious b.eliefs of these gradua,te students, there 
see~ so~e basis ~or interpreting their reports o~ no 
religious preference as ~plying a rejection of religious 
belief (Gl~ck and Stark, 1965:210). . ~ 
Such interpretation would be unimaginable for Yinger who insists that people 
should be asked not only what religion they have left but also what 
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religion they have gone to, as indicated above. 
Whether the secularization hypothesis is born out by empirical data 
depends very much on the choice of data or the mode of interpreting data 
which in turn hinges on the definition of religion. While most of the 
sociologists prefering an inclusive definition of religion tend to 
question no longer primarily the reliability of the data but the very 
validity of the data as indices of religiosity. Sociologists choo$~ng an 
exclusive definition tend to argue that the existing data do provide at 
least some evidence for the hypothesis of secularization. Both groups are 
inclined to exaggerate and stretch the meaning and significance of the data 
in favor of their respective views, despite the appearance of scientific 
objectivity. 
Summary 
The objective of this chapter has been to indicate how sociologists 
adopting different kinds of definitions of religion use and intepret 
empirical data to endorse their different positions. It has been pointed 
out that sociologists committed to an inclusive definition tend to regard 
the history of religion as a history of religious change, variously seen 
as adaptation, evolution, transformation, or institutionalization of 
religious values in society. Even when the history of Christianity in the 
West is viewed as a history of religious decline, it is not considered as 
a unitary and irreversible process of decline. Its nihilistic elements 
notwithstanding, the recent youth movement is seen mostly as a sign of 
religious vitality, variously interpreted as the search for new answers 
to existential problems, the dawn of a new religious revolution, the 
~ 
emergence of a new religious consciousness, or as the protext against an 
over-rationalized society and the like. Refusing to accept church 
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statistics and most recent research data as adequate indices of religiosity 
in general, these sociologists have the tendency to minimize the signifi-
cance of church statistics and research materials by emphasizing the 
ubiquity of private and personal religions or by adducing only those data 
that favor their positions. On the other hand, those sociologists devoted 
to an exclusive definition tend to interpret the history of religion as 
a history of religious decline understood as desacralization, seculariza-
tion of culture, diminution of influence both in social life and individual 
consciousness, or deviation from orthodoxy. They are inclined to see the 
outburst of the new religions more as an evidence for the insignificance 
of traditional religions than as an indication of a renewed religious 
vitality. Though fully aware of the inadequacies ofreligious statistics 
and research materials as indices of religiosity as such, they do use 
them as some proof for the hypothesis of secularization. Unlike their 
inclusivist counterparts, these sociologists tend to minimize the import-
ance of private religions, but like them, they, too, tend to overlook 
data that disfavor their views. 
It appears that precisely in the collecting and interpreting empirical 
materials, which are supposed to be strictly scientific activities, one can 
see more clearly how easily scientists, despite their avowed objectivity 
and neutrality, become victims of personal value, bias, and even temper-
ament and select only those data that can serve to support their pre-
conceived interpretative schemes. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
The purpose of this thesis has been to point out the discrepancies 
of the leading contemporary sociological views on the issue of seculariza-
tion by showing how the different definitions of religion proposed by a 
group of representative contemporary sociologists of religion have affected 
their understanding of the concept, cause, and future direction of seculari-
zation. I have shown that when religion is defined in generic terms, none 
of these sociologists is willing to accept the concept of secularization, 
if it implies a notion of anihevitabledemise of religion. But, when 
religion is understood as a specific form of religion, all of these 
sociologists, each in his fashion, have developed some concept of secular-
ization. 
Further, I have indicated that sociologists who adopt an inclusive 
definition of religion are inclined to maintain that religion changes but 
never declines (let alone dies) and hence the concept of secularization is 
inconceivable. Consequently, for these sociologists, no factor can be 
considered as a cause of secularization, and to talk about the future 
course of secularization is meaningless. On·the other hand, those sociolo-
gists who prefer an exclusive definition are likely to hold that religion 
does decline, if not dies, and to regard many factors, especially science 
and social differentiation to be causes of secularization. While some of 
them tend to predict the continuation of the process of secularization in 
the future, others are more willing to grant the possibility of a reversal 
of the process. 
As to the empirical evidence, although all these sociologists are 
fully aware of the lack of adequate and reliable data about present and 
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past religious situations, they all seek to substantiate their respective 
positions through some historical, statistical, or survey materials. 
Sociologists who employ an inclusive definition of religion are prone to 
see the history of religion as a history of religious change, to consider 
church statistics as well as the existing survey instruments to be invalid 
to measure religiosity as such, and to interpret the current new religious 
movement as a sign of the persistence of religion. They tend to emphasize 
the existence of the invisible religions such as magic, superstitions, and 
so on, and are skeptical of the assumed high religiosity of the past. But, 
those sociologists who work with an exclusive definition are more likely to 
regard the history of religion as a history of religious decline, to con-
sider religious statistics and survey data as, at least, some indices of 
secularization, and to view the upsurge of the new religions as a symptom 
of religious crisis and irrelevance of existing religions in modern society. 
They tend to ignore the so-called subterranean religions and assume, often 
uncritically, that people in the past were more religious than they are 
today. Both groups tend to adduce survey findings and religious statistics 
that support their views, ignoring those opposing their positionst 
All in all, if the concept of secularization is taken as a notion 
that suggests an irreversible process of religious demise, none of these 
leading contemporary sociologists of religion can be said to be an advo-
cate of secularization; if, however, it is understood as the decline or 
demise of a particular religious institution, all of these sociologists 
may be called the exponents of secularization. Further, if secularization 
is defined as the decline of religion tout court, those who use an exclusive 
~ 
definition of religion would be considered the advocates of secularization 
but not those who opt for an inclusive one. Hence, none of these leading 
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sociologists of religion can be treated as an advocate of secularization 
without qualification. 
rfuether definitions of religion should be a matter of individual 
preference or not, it has surely been shown that they have been such and 
that they have a fundamental impact on the outcome of the discussion of 
secularization. Since each definition of religion--by implication, each 
view on the issue of secularization--represents an ideological stance, to 
call any other perspective on secularization an ideology, a dogma, a myth 
or the like only shows its own ideological position. Thus, as long as the 
problem of definition is not solved, the divergences of opinion on the 
issue of secularization are bound to remain. 
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